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Loss Carryovers and Corporate Alterations:
Toward a Uniform Approach
James B. Loken*
I. INTRODUCTION-THE AVERAGING CONCEPT
Sections I and 11 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 im-
pose a tax on the taxable income earned by individuals and cor-
porations in each "taxable year." The decision to levy the tax
on income annually is administratively logical; it is also equitable
to average each taxpayer's instantaneous financial ups and downs
over a reasonable period of time. However, accumulation of tax-
able income not only fluctuates, but fluctuates differently with
each taxpaying entity. Consequently, a graduated tax imposed
inflexibly over a one year period will be disproportionately bur-
densome to some taxpayers. For example, a corporation that
earns $100,000 in year A and loses $100,000 in year B will pay
more annual tax than a corporation that breaks even each year.
The federal tax laws have long recognized the potential
inequities of too rigid adherence to the taxable year concept.
A number of current Code provisions permit some form of
"averaging" beyond a single tax year. The lower rate on capi-
tal gains, for example, is partially justified by a notion that,
because capital assets are sold infrequently, increases in their
value should not be taxed heavily in the year of sale.- A more
obvious example of averaging is the Code's treatment of transac-
tions within the definition of installment sales. 2  Additional,
rather limited averaging benefits have been legislatively con-
ferred, perhaps in response to rather harsh judicial decisions, 3
upon certain taxpayers who receive prepaid subscription income
or dues. 4 Another example of the averaging principle can be
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. See Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130,
134 (1960). However, the 25% tax rate and the definition of long-term
capital gains seem far too arbitrary to make this a wholly satisfactory
rationale for present law.
2. Only that portion of gain received each year is taxed. See
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(b) [1954 Code provisions hereinafter
cited by section numbers only].
3. See, e.g., Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
But see Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.
1955).
4. Sections 455, 456. Broader averaging benefits had been con-
ferred in 1954, but Treasury insistence led to a retraction. Act of
June 15, 1955, ch. 143, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 Stat. 134. See Schlude v.
Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
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found in cases setting forth the "tax benefit rule,' 5 which states,
basically, that recovery of losses such as bad debts will not be
treated as income to the extent that the previous deduction did
not reduce taxes. Congress has recently demonstrated further
willingness to adopt the averaging concept to promote fairness
in the federal tax laws. The Revenue Act of 1964 amended sec-
tions 1301-1307 of the 1954 Code to permit individual taxpayers
to reduce the tax impact of a year of extraordinarily high in-
come through a complex averaging formula based on the previ-
ous four years' income.6
These examples illustrate the degree to which averaging
provisions permeate the tax laws. But the most important adop-
tion of the averaging concept is also the oldest-the net operating
loss deduction defined in section 172 of the Code. Under pres-
ent law, a taxpayer receives a deduction for a net operating
loss in a given year which may be carried back three years and
then forward five years to offset taxable income of those other
years7 Loss carryovers8 are available both to individual and cor-
porate taxpayers,9 and a taxpayer may offset income from one
source with a net operating loss from another.'0
There has been very little criticism of the net operating loss
carryover as a form of income averaging," but there has been
5. See Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and the Loss Carryover Pro-
visions of the 1954 Code, 67 YALE L.J. 1394, 1399 n.26 (1958). This
doctrine is codified in § 111.
6. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232 (a), 78 Stat. 19.
7. Sections 172(b) (1) (A) (i), (b) (1) (B). The net operating loss
deduction equals the excess of deductions over gross income, with im-
portant modifications set forth in § 172(d). The mechanics of com-
puting the deduction and of applying it to present, past, and future
income are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally 5 J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION §§ 29.02a-d (rev. ed. 1963). See also
§ 1212, which creates the "capital loss carryover," an analogous crea-
ture beyond the scope of this Article.
8. The author will use "carryover" when referring to carryfor-
wards and carrybacks taken as a unit. "Carryforward" and "carry-
back" will be used only when either individually is being discussed.
In § 172, "carryover" means carryforward.
9. Certain taxpayers, such as common trust funds (§ 584(g)),
partnerships (§ 703 (a) (2) (E)), regulated investment companies (§ 852
(b) (2) (B)), and real estate investment trusts (§ 857(b) (2) (E)), are
not allowed a net operating loss deduction.
10. There are some exceptions. Insurance companies, for example,
cannot offset insurance income with operating losses from other busi-
nesses, §§ 804(c) (5) (C), 822(c) (8) (B), 832(b) (5), 832(c) (4); non-
resident aliens may offset taxable income only with losses related to
United States income, § 873.
11. Arguments against this type of averaging are set forth in
Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business-II, 108
[Vol. 52:571
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almost total disagreement on the extent to which a net operating
loss carryover should survive fundamental alteration of the tax-
payer which incurred the loss. Basically, the problem is wheth-
er (and when) a loss carryover may be transferred from one
taxpaying entity to another. This difficult question arises when-
ever any tax attribute, whether it be a deduction, the basis of
assets, or the earnings and profits of a corporation, is transferred.
However, because operating losses reduce taxes only to the extent
that the taxpayer has income against which to offset them, free
transferability of such losses to profitable taxpaying entities
would result in more net operating loss deductions being used.12
Consequently, the problem is economically more serious than
when a deferral of taxes (carryover basis) or the characteriza-
tion of gain (earnings and profits) is at issue. Protection of
federal revenues dictates that transferability be limited to those
cases in which the averaging purposes behind the net operating
loss deduction will be furthered.
The subject of this Article, stated most broadly, is the sta-
tus of a net operating loss carryover after an alteration of the
corporate taxpayer which incurred the loss. Alteration can in-
volve a change of business, a change in identity (such as rein-
corporation in another state), a change in ownership, or any
combination of the foregoing. Altogether, the topic has been
divided into five parts. Part H will outline the judicial and leg-
islative history of the problem; Part III will seek a theoretical so-
lution based upon the averaging concept underlying this deduc-
tion and the economic factors surrounding its application; Part
IV will discuss in further detail specific problems in the current
legislative and judicial approach to loss carryovers; and Part V
will examine the author's proposal for statutory reform.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The most notable characteristic of the law applicable to loss
carryover transferability, both past and present, is the extent to
which the Congress and the federal courts have experimented in
their search for a suitable set of governing principles. The re-
sulting doctrinal melange makes it difficult to understand, much
less to summarize, the current status of loss carryover law. It
U. PA. L. REv. 943, 948-49 (1960). Lanning admits, however, that
this is an accepted form of tax relief.
12. See C. R. Peterson, Corporate Distributions and Adjustments:
A General Survey, 3 TAx REvIsioN ComP=Drumv 1611, 1616 (House
Comm. on Ways and Means 1959).
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is, therefore, analytically necessary to give a general and rough-
ly chronological summary of the various doctrines which have
been used to solve problems in this broad field before examining
through leading recent cases the current state of affairs.
A. THE TAXPAYER ENTITY DocTRINE
Congress enacted the first loss carryover provision as part of
the Revenue Act of 1918. Section 204(b) of that Act provided
that "any taxpayer" who thereafter sustained a net loss might
deduct such loss "from the net income of the taxpayer for the
preceding year [and then from] the net income for the succeeding
taxable year."'13 Although the timespan over which a carryover
could be applied was frequently altered, subsequent loss carry-
over provisions prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 con-
tained substantially identical language. 14
In the early cases which arose under these provisions, the
courts seized upon the term "the taxpayer" when confronted
with the problem of whether loss carryovers should survive vari-
ous corporate alterations. Ignoring such factors as continuity
of interest and change of business, they focused only on whether
the corporate entity seeking to carry over a net loss was the
same corporate entity which had sustained it. The Supreme
Court in the then leading case of New Colonial Ice Company v.
Helvering'5 reasoned that Congress, in specifying that only in-
come of "the taxpayer" could be offset by a loss carryover, had
simply made explicit the general purpose of the tax laws "to
confine allowable losses to the taxpayer sustaining them." Be-
cause deductions are a matter of "legislative grace," the Court
added,16 it had no authority to permit a loss carryover to survive
a change in the taxpaying entity. Similar emphasis on the statu-
13. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1061 (emphasis
added).
14. The numerous statutes are cited in Note, Net Operating Loss
Carryovers and Corporate Adjustments: Retaining an Advantageous
Tax under Lisbon Shops and Sections 269, 381 and 382, 69 YALE L.J. 1201,
1202 n.5 (1960).
15. 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934), affg 66 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1933), aff'g
24 B.T.A. 886 (1931).
16. Id. at 440. New Colonial is apparently the first pronounce-
ment of the legislative grace doctrine, a generalization as objectionable
as its converse-that revenue laws are to be strictly construed in favor
of the taxpayer. See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that
Deductions Are To Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative
Grace, 56 HAv. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
[Vol. 52:571
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tory phrase "the taxpayer" can be found in a host of loss carry-
over cases of this era.17
B. THE AcQuirrioN To Avon) TAXES DocTR=
The New Colonial taxpayer entity doctrine was concerned
wholly with form rather than with the economic significance of
particular alterations in a loss corporation. Although it was
woefully arbitrary, there was little governmental pressure to
change the doctrine because it typically worked to the Commis-
sioner's advantage. However, on its face it would permit loss car-
ryovers to survive purchase of the stock of a losing corporate en-
terprise, termination of that enterprise, and transfer of a profit-
able business to the loss corporation "shell" by the new owners,
since such a transaction would leave intact the corporate entity
that first incurred the net operating losses.
For some reason, the early loss carryover cases did not in-
volve such transactions, although one decision strongly indicated
that the taxpayer entity doctrine would not prevent carryover
survival.18 Nonetheless, Congress was not unaware of this tax
avoidance danger, and World War II brought the matter to a
head. The war created a need for increased revenue, and an
excess profits tax was enacted.' 9 Included in this law was an
averaging device, the unused excess profits credit, which reduced
the inequitable impact of the excess profits tax on taxpayers with
sharply fluctuating incomes.20 When the practice of purchasing
17. See, e.g., Weber Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 764
(10th Cir. 1936); General Fin. Co., 32 B.T.A. 949 (1935), af'd, 85 F.2d
846 (3d Cir. 1936); May Oil Burner Corp., 27 B.T.A. 1281 (1933), af'd,
71 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1934); Athol Mfg. Co., 22 B.T.A. 105, a-f'd, 54 F.2d
230 (1st Cir. 1931); Maytag Co., 17 B.T.A. 182 (1929); Phillip C. Donner,
16 B.T.A. 758 (1929).
18. Northway Sec. Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931).
19. Act of Oct. 8, 1940, ch. 757, tit. II, 54 Stat. 975, as amended, 55
Stat. 17 (1941).
20. The details of the unused excess profits credit are beyond the
scope of this Article. In general, the excess profits credit, based on a
taxpayer's average income, was subtracted from "excess profits net in-
come" in determining "adjusted excess profits net income" upon which
the tax was imposed. If excess profits net income did not exhaust the
credit for a given year, a taxpayer was permitted to carry over the
unused portion to past and future years. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 710
(c), added by ch. 10, § 2, 55 Stat. 17 (1941). See generally 7A J.
MERTENS, supra note 7, §§ 42.32-.34, 42.37 et. seq. If an unused excess
profits credit survived corporate acquisitions, transferees could acquire
a substantial tax benefit. Since the purpose of the carryover was averag-
ing, this Article, like most courts, will treat the issue of transferability
like that of loss carryovers. A distinction should be noted, however, in
19681
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loss corporations with an eye toward utilizing an unused excess
profits credit or a loss carryover was publicized, Congress re-
sponded by enacting section 129 of the 1939 Code (now section
269 of the 1954 Code).21 This provision called for the disallow-
ance of any deduction or credit possessed by a corporation the
control of which had been acquired for "evasion or avoidance of
Federal income or excess profits tax by securing the benefit" of
such deduction or credit which the acquirer "would not other-
wise enjoy."
The tax avoidance possibilities in prior law were almost
immediately demonstrated by Alprosa Watch Corp.2 2 Owners of
a shipment of imported watches acquired a loss corporation,
changed its name and sold off its old assets, and transferred
the watches to it. Despite the changes in corporate name, busi-
ness, owners, and location, the Tax Court permitted prior losses
to offset income from the watch business. The taxpayer entity
remained the same, explained the court, there was a business
purpose for the alterations, and section 129 did not apply to the
tax years in question.23 In addition, the Tax Court, in a dictum
that was reaffirmed in later cases, 24 set back the law's develop-
ment a few years when it declared that section 129 would not in
any event disallow deductions or credits claimed by the acquired
corporation. This anomalous distinction was not accepted by
the case of a company that sustains losses during protracted dissolution.
The excess profits credit envisions a going business; to permit a dying
company with greatly reduced capacity to carry back unused portions of
its credit to its normal years would encourage the obvious abuse of
extended dissolutions. The loss carryover, on the other hand, is in-
tended to average profit and loss years of a taxpayer regardless of the
cause of a bad year. A loss carryback, therefore, should be allowed
from the dissolution period to a prior profitable year. Compare Acampo
Wineries & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946), with Wier Long Leaf
Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990 (1947), and Winter & Co., 13 T.C. 108 (1949).
.21. Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 128, 58 Stat. 47 (1944). The
legislative history of this statute is interesting and instructive. See
H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1943); S. REP. No. 627, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1943).
22. 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
23. The Tax Court placed principal reliance on the New Colonial
taxpayer entity doctrine and specifically on Northway Sec. Co., 23
B.T.A. 532 (1931), which could have been distinguished on the ground
that it involved a relatively small change in the ownership of the
loss corporation. When one considers that the taxpayer entity doctrine
was a product of judicial fear of loss carryover transfer, its rote ap-
plication in Alprosa seems remarkable. See Tarleau, Acquisition of
Loss Companies, 31 TAxEs 1050 (1953).
24. See Wage, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952); A.B. & Container Corp., 14




the federal courts of appeals,25 however, and many years later the
Tax Court finally overruled itself and held that section 129, if
applicable, would disallow a carryover in the Alprosa situation.26
The section 129 doctrine is very much alive today in the loss
carryover area. It has been applied in a large number of cases,
both before and after 1954, to disallow loss carryovers where the
courts have been able to infer that a principal purpose behind
the acquisition of assets or stock of a loss corporation was to
gain the benefit of an existing carryover.2 7 Like the sham trans-
action rule of cases like Gregory v. Helvering,28 however, it is a
doctrine of general applicability. Thus, while it is of great sig-
nificance to the tax planner, it provides little help in the search
for a workable treatment of the specific problem of loss carry-
over transferability.
25. See Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd., 278 F.2d
392 (9th Cir. 1960), rev'g 31 T.C. 437 (1958); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v.
Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959) (alternative holding); Coastal Oil
Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957). This last
case denied an extra surtax exemption for an acquired subsidiary. The
multiple surtax exemption question is now covered specifically by §
1551, which denies an exemption if a "major purpose" of an inter-
corporate transfer was to secure such a benefit. The application of
this provision has been criticized. See B. BrTKER, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATIOx OF CoRPoRATIoNs AND SHAREHOLDERS 57-61 (1959).
26. See Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. 400 (1960), aff'd, 288
F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
27. See, e.g., Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), affd, 358 F.2d
342 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); J. T. Slocomb Co.,
38 T.C. 752 (1962), affd, 334 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Temple Square
Vlfg. Co., 36 T.C. 88 (1961).
Overruling of the Alprosa dictum is not the only judicial strengthen-
ing of § 129 and § 269 in recent years. In later cases, the Tax Court has
been much more willing to weigh the various motivations for a particu-
lar transaction and to conclude that tax avoidance was a "principal pur-
pose." Compare T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957), with Frank Spingolo
Warehouse Co., 37 T.C. 1 (1961), and Urban Redevelopment Corp.,
34 T.C. 845 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1961). Taxpayers who
survive this provision today generally can show a bona fide attempt to
operate the acquired loss corporation business and an ignorance of tax
advantages at the time of acquisition. See John B. Stetson Co., 33 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1964); Baton Rouge Supply Co., 36 T.C. 1 (1961).
These events have proven wrong those who once suggested that § 269
was a dead letter. See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and
K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 876, 877 (1959)
(statement of Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Director, Dept. of Research, AFL-
CIO) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Group Hearings]; Susser, Tax Con-
sequences of the Net Operating Loss Deduction, 5 TAx L. Rnv. 211, 221-
22 (1950).
28. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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C. THE STATUTORY MERGER DocTRnE
At the same time the Commissioner was faced with the unfa-
vorable Alprosa decision, the rigid taxpayer entity doctrine was
creating tensions on the other side of the tax litigation dialogue.
A host of loss corporations found that some innocent or perhaps
compulsory alteration in form, such as reincorporation in another
state or merger with a wholly owned subsidiary, had put in jeop-
ardy their valuable loss carryover deductions. Such taxpayers
fought in every available forum to avoid the broad grasp of
New Colonial's emphasis on "the taxpayer," but, until 1949, to
no avail. New Colonial was applied by rote despite the fact
that the words "the taxpayer" had been eliminated in the 1939
Code and then re-inserted in 1942 all with no explanation, 29 and
despite the fact that the courts allowed other valuable tax attri-
butes to survive identical alterations in corporate entity whether
or not there was express statutory direction. 30
This illogical and unjust doctrine was first rejected by the
Second Circuit in Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner.3'
At issue was an unused excess profits credit which the Commis-
sioner disallowed because of an intervening corporate merger.
To avoid the Commissioner's potent reliance on the New Colon-
ial argument that a different "taxpayer" survived the merger,
the court noted that Stanton Brewery was formed by a statu-
tory merger whereas New Colonial had involved a purchase of
assets. 32 In addition, the court found the Commissioner's "tax-
payer" argument unrealistic and thus held for the taxpayer.
29. Compare Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 153(a), 56 Stat. 847,
with Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 211(b), 53 Stat. 862. This oddity
surely emphasizes the natural reaction that this phrase was not in-
tended to be of substantive significance.
30. See Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522 (1939),
where a parent corporation was permitted to inherit its subsidiary's
unamortized bond discount after a de facto merger through liquidation.
31. 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'g 11 T.C. 310 (1948).
32. The court relied on Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306
U.S. 522 (1939). Although Metropolitan Edison involved the unrelated
problem of the survival of unamortized bond discount after a merger,
the Supreme Court's language about a transferor being "drowned" in
its successor after a statutory merger was congenial to the Second
Circuit's position in Stanton Brewery and permitted the lower court to
"distinguish" New Colonial. Arguably, only subsequent interpretations
of New Colonial had supplied its inflexible gloss, and it seems unfortu-
nate that the Stanton Brewery court was not more courageous in seeking
a better rationale. On the other hand, considering the lack of authority
for any workable test as of 1949, an invitation to the Supreme Court to
clarify New Colonial might have been disastrous.
[Vol. 52:571
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The statutory merger doctrine has had little significance
beyond its importance as the first judicial break from unthinking
application of the New Colonial taxpayer entity doctrine. The
Tax Court and the Commissioner did not accept the statutory
merger distinction.33 Only a few such cases reached the other
federal courts. A number supported the Second Circuit, but
more out of distaste for the entity concept than out of analyti-
cal enthusiasm for the unsatisfactory emphasis on the form of a
merger under state law.3 4  The Supreme Court eventually
downgraded the doctrine without disapproving it. 35 Because the
Congress enacted other solutions to the loss carryover problem
in the 1954 Code, the statutory merger doctrine today plays
only a marginal role in the few cases remaining which involve
the 1939 Code's tax years.36
D. THE 1954 CODE PROVIsIoNS
In the 1954 Code, Congress for the first time addressed itself
explicitly to the problem of loss carryover transferability. The
committee reports37 lamented the "uncertain and frequently con-
tradictory" court-made law which emphasized the form rather
than the economic substance of corporate alterations. Congress
also complained that section 129 had failed to halt "trafficking
in loss corporations," no doubt with Alprosa and its revenue-
damaging dictum in mind.
33. See Eleanor H. Vendig, 22 T.C. 1127 (1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 229 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1956); California Casket Co., 19 T.C. 32(1952); cf. Standard Paving Co., 13 T.C. 425, 446 (1949), af-f'd, 190 F.2d
330 (10th Cir. 1951). Literature of the period, however, was quick to
point out the new tax advantages to statutory mergers. See, e.g., Note,
Statutory Mergers are Tax-Favored, 6 TAx L. REv. 102 (1950). As
Alprosa and Stanton Brewery were decided almost simultaneously, they
together must have sparked considerable interest among businessmen
and their tax counsel over the possibility of successfully "trafficking in
loss corporations." See Note, Net Operating Loss Carryovers, 69 YALE
L.J. 1201 n.1 (1960).
34. See F.C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir.)
(Magruder, C. J.), rev'g 159 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1958); Newmarket
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956) (Magruder,
C. J.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957), rev'g 130 F. Supp. 706 (D.
Mass. 1955); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1955); Koppers Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957); Moldit, Inc. v. Jarecki, 1953-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. f 9551 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
35. See Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957), affg
229 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1956).
36. See Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 475.
37. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 284-86 (1954).
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In response to these problems, Congress created a whole new
statutory scheme. The phrase "the taxpayer" was eliminated
from section 172, which established the net operating loss car-
ryover. Section 129 was substantially reenacted as section 269.
Then, Congress added two new provisions to subchapter C, the
corporate "adjustments" subchapter. The first, section 381, enu-
merates twenty-two specific tax attributes to which an acquiring
corporation succeeds if it acquires the assets of another cor-
poration in a section 332 liquidation or in a section 368 (a) (1)
(A), (C), (D) ("but only if the requirements of subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of section 354(b) (1) are met"), 3s or (F) reorgani-
zation. Among the attributes listed are net operating loss carry-
overs, but a carryback of net operating losses is denied in all
section 381 cases except the (F) reorganization.39 In the second
new provision, section 382, Congress codified "special limitations
on net operating loss carryovers." Basically, section 382(a)
covers taxable alterations-it eliminates carryovers when, in
general, there is a substantial change in the ownership of a loss
corporation within the previous two years and the corporation
has not continued to carry on substantially the same trade or
business. Section 382(b) refines the loss carryover rules appli-
cable to most tax free reorganizations-it reduces carryovers
otherwise allowed in full by section 381 if the original owners of
the loss corporation do not own at least twenty per cent of the
resulting corporation's stock as the result of their prior ownership
of the loss corporation.
One can infer that Congress in 1954 focused primarily on
anomalies created by the confrontation between the taxpayer
entity and the statutory merger doctrines and on the loophole
created by Alprosa's rigid adherence to the entity concept and
its weakening of section 129 of the 1939 Code. Sections 381 and
382 (b) now replace the entity and merger doctrines, and sections
382(a) and 269 plug the Alprosa loophole. However, because
Congress failed to embrace a single doctrine in the 1954 Code
provisions and because it failed to anticipate many issues, 40 the
38. This limitation is primarily intended to exclude "divisive"
(D) reorganizations from coverage under § 381. See text accompanying
notes 129-131 infra.
39. Sections 381(b) (3), (c) (1).
40. For example, the Senate substantially revised § 382, adding
the change of business requirement in § 382(a) (1) (C) and the 20%
continuity of ownership requirement in § 382(b). Yet the Senate
Committee Report, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 284-86 (1954),
contained at least two troublesome comments: that § 269 is inapplica-
ble to any transaction covered by § 382, and an intimation that a § 382
[Vol. 52:571
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new provisions simply substituted new confusion and uncer-
tainty for the old, though concededly on a more satisfying ana-
lytical plane. Thus, the 1954 Code should be viewed as a still
embryonic treatment of loss carryover transferability.41
E. THE LIBSON SHOPS DocTiNE
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Libson Shops,
Inc. v. Koehler,42 it appeared that the statutory merger-tax-
payer entity confrontation would be resolved.43 In that case,
eight individuals owned sixteen retail corporations and one com-
mon management corporation. These merged into one corpora-
tion which carried on all operations thereafter. Three of the
sixteen had sustained net operating losses prior to merger, and
the resultant corporation attempted to carry forward these losses
to post-merger income derived from the other stores. The Com-
missioner relied on the New Colonial "the taxpayer" doctrine,
while the taxpayer based its argument for carryover survival on
the Stanton Brewery statutory merger doctrine.
Mr. Justice Burton for the majority began, quite predict-
ably, by stating that " [ t] he contentions of the parties require us
to decide whether it can be said that petitioner, a combination
of 16 sales businesses, is 'the taxpayer' having the pre-merger
losses of three of those businesses." 44 The Court's answer was
a complete surprise. Accepting an alternative argument made
by the Government, the Court held that petitioner was not the
(a) change of business must result from the requisite change of owner-
ship. The Treasury has apparently rejected the first comment, cf. Rev.
Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 147, and no one has taken the second
seriously.
41. The House minority report applauded the attempt to obtain
rules of mechanical certainty in Subchapter C but expressed doubt that
these provisions had been drafted with sufficient understanding, a neces-
sity "in this field of ingenious adaptation [requiring lines] ... drawn
beyond the shadow of easy manipulation." H.R. RE'. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. at B22.
42. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
43. Although Libson Shops reached the Supreme Court in 1957,
provisions of the 1939 Code were applicable because Congress had not
given retroactive effect to §§ 381 and 382 of the 1954 Code. See § 394.
That Libson Shops, the most significant decision under the 1939 Code,
was not decided until after passage of the 1954 Code has added to
the confusing status of loss carryover law-Libson Shops adopted a
novel doctrine, and no one can say with certainty whether the 1954
Congress would have approved of that doctrine. One can answer this
question with some confidence, however. See text accompanying notes
113-14 infra.
44. 353 U.S. at 385.
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same taxpayer because it lacked "continuity of business enter-
prise" with the pre-merger loss corporations. This continuity
was lacking, explained the Court, because the companies before
merger had filed separate tax returns and because, given post-
merger losses by the losing businesses, the carryovers could
not have been utilized without the merger. The Court distin-
guished the statutory merger cases on the ground that they
had involved business continuity, and it added in a footnote
that it was not passing on cases that involved alterations of a
"single corporate taxpayer," such as Alprosa.45
Libson Shops was a thunderbolt. With no warning, taxpay-
ers suddenly faced a new overriding doctrine which would gov-
ern the transferability of loss carryovers. Not only was the
"continuity of business enterprise" doctrine unpredicted, but it
also did not seem to reflect the thinking of Congress manifested
in the 1954 Code enacted just three years earlier,40 nor did it
parallel the continuity-of-interest tests which had been applied
to other, admittedly distinguishable corporate reorganization
problems. 47  The two major questions following Libson Shops
were what effect it would have on factually distinguishable cases
under the 1939 Code, and whether it would have an impact on
cases under the 1954 Code. The first question was for the most
part answered, unfavorably to taxpayers, by subsequent cases
and rulings dealing with 1939 Code years.48  The second and
more important question remains unresolved and is a major
source of the confusion surrounding the current law.49
F. RECENT CASES AND RULINGS UNDER THE 1954 CODE
Despite the multiplicity of standards which the 1954 Code
provisions apply to various loss carryover situations, they have
in many respects functioned smoothly and effectively. Section
269's proscription of acquisitions motivated by a tax avoidance
45. 353 U.S. at 390 n.9.
46. See text accompanying notes 113-14 infra.
47. See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); John A.
Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
48. See, e.g., Federal Cement Tile Co., 40 T.C. 1028 (1963), aff'd,
338 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1964); Norden-Ketay Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1457 (1962), af-Fd, 319 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953
(1963); J.G. Dudley Co., 36 T.C. 1122 (1961), affd, 298 F.2d 750 (4th
Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 475.
49. Problems raised by Libson Shops are rather deprecatingly
summarized by Judge Friendly in Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 335 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965),
ajf'g 40 T.C. 870 (1963).
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purpose has been frequently invoked to disallow loss carryovers
after loss corporation acquisitions." It is perhaps the broad
sweep of this section combined with the more objective and
understandable standards in section 382 which have led to a grad-
ual diminishing of loss carryover litigation under the 1954 Code.
Section 382(b), which requires that owners of an acquired
loss corporation receive twenty per cent ownership of the result-
ant corporation "as the result of owning stock of the loss corpora-
tion," has had little judicial interpretation. However, the recent
Tax Court decision in Commonwealth Container Corp. 51 is most
instructive. There, a loss corporation was merged into a larger
profit corporation. Prior to the merger, owners of the loss corpo-
ration also owned seventy-five per cent of the stock of the profit
corporation, and they received some additional profit corporation
stock as a result of the merger. The Tax Court admitted that
there was significant continuity of ownership but felt compelled
to apply the objective test of section 382 (b). That test compelled
disallowance of thirty-five per cent of the carryover because the
loss corporation's owners received only thirteen per cent of the
profit corporation's stock "as the result of" the merger. The Tax
Court was not even dissuaded by its opinion that the phrase "as
the result of" was most likely inserted in section 382 (b) to guard
against unrelated abuses: "there is no ambiguity in the words
used in the statute, and if they are applied literally here, the re-
duction provided in section 382 must be applied."' 2
If Commonwealth Container is any indication, it would seem
that the relatively innocent-sounding section 382(b) in fact has a
significant bite-it prevents the use of tax free transactions to
realign commonly owned corporations so that full utilization of
loss carryovers can be realized, except in those few cases where
the narrow ambit of section 382 (b) (3) controls.58
Section 382(a) establishes another, completely independent
limitation on loss carryover transferability, totally disallowing
loss carryovers when a corporation has a 50 per cent change in
50. See, e.g., H.F. Ramsey Co., 43 T.C. 500 (1965); Pauline W. Ach,
42 T.C. 115 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
899 (1966); Herbert Luke, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1122 (1964), affd, 351
F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965). However, the peculiar presumption inserted
into this provision as § 269(c) to strengthen the statute has, as com-
mentators predicted, proved unworkable. See B. BiTrzma, supra note
25, at 57; Wallace Corp., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43 (1964).
51. 48 T.C. 483 (1967).
52. Id. at 492.
53. Text accompanying notes 122-25 infra.
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ownership by "purchase" and does not continue "to carry on a
trade or business substantially the same" as that conducted prior
to the ownership change. The change of ownership standards of
this section, though complex, are thoroughly treated by Treas-
ury Regulations"4 and have led to little litigation. An indica-
tion of how courts interpret this subsection is Glover Packing
Company v. United States.r By agreement, Mr. Glover pur-
chased ten per cent of plaintiff loss corporation's stock and nine-
ty per cent was placed in a voting trust. The device was ad-
mittedly intended to avoid the criteria of section 382 (a): control
of the corporation passed immediately to Glover, and one-seventh
of the voting trust stock was to be transferred to the corporate
treasury in each of the next seven years. The Court of Claims
held that there was a section 382(a) change of ownership be-
cause that section measures change by fair market value of
stock outstanding. It noted that the voting trust arrangement
placed Glover in control and ruled that the voting trust stock
was, therefore, rendered relatively worthless and not "outstand-
ing" within the meaning of the statute.56 As the court also
found the requisite change of business, the loss carryovers were
disallowed.
The bulk of litigation under section 382 (a) has involved the
question of whether a substantial change of business occurred
after a change in the loss corporation's ownership. Taxpayers
have enjoyed frequent success on this issue.57  Although radi-
54. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.382(a)-i(c) to (g) (1962). Section 382
(a) applies only if, essentially, any one or more of the ten persons
who own the greatest percentage of the fair market value of a loss
corporation's stock have increased their holdings, by "purchase," 50
percentage points within the two previous years. Purchase is defined
in § 382(a) (4) as a stock acquisition after which basis is determined
by reference to the acquirer's cost. In addition, the attribution rules
of § 318 are, with some modifications, made applicable by § 382 (a) (3).
55. 328 F.2d 342 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
56. Compare Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d
713 (9th Cir. 1965), where common stock of a loss corporation was
placed in a voting trust, and assets of a potentially profitable business
were transferred to the corporation for a short period of time in ex-
change for preferred stock. Though the arrangement was undoubtedly
devised to avoid § 382(a), the court of appeals held that statute in-
applicable without considering an argument that the common had been
stripped of over 50% of its value. Admittedly, the argument is more
tenuous than in Glover Packing.
57. See Koppers Co. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 159 (W.D.
Pa. 1964); Wallace Corp., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43 (1964); Goodwyn
Crockery Co., 37 T.C. 355 (1961), affd, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963).
Of course, a logical reason why taxpayers have been successful in
§ 382 (a) cases is that clear examples of trafficking are attacked under
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cal changes in business undertakings have not escaped section
382(a) disallowance,58 a guiding principle of these decisions is
that, since rehabilitation of a losing enterprise usually requires
some revamping of operations, the requirement of business "con-
tinuity" of section 382 (a) (1) (C) should be satisfied if the new
owner can show that relatively minor changes were made in a
bona fide attempt to revitalize the losing business. The few dis-
agreements over proper interpretation of this standard do not
seem particularly significant. 9
Although sections 269 and 382 effectively disallow carryovers
in a large number of tax-motivated situations, transactions can be
structured to avoid the objective criteria of these provisions. Be-
cause Congress made such a complete break with past treatment
of this area in 1954, the difficult question now is how courts
should deal with such transactions and specifically whether the
continuity of business doctrine developed by the Supreme Court
after 1954 in Libson Shops should be followed. Had Libson Shops
been governed by the 1954 Code, section 381 would have allowed
the carryovers in question to survive.6 0 As Congress in section
382 (a) adopted the change of business doctrine only in conjunc-
tion with a change of ownership test, most commentators have
argued that Libson Shops should be inapplicable to 1954 Code tax
years."1
§ 269; when it is difficult to establish that business has been altered, it
is almost, a fortiori, more difficult to demonstrate that tax benefits
were the principle purpose behind a change in ownership.
58. See John S. Taft, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1239 (1961) (alternative
holding), affd, 314 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1963).
59. Some disagreement has arisen over whether carryovers should
survive when new owners reactivate a loss corporation's dormant busi-
ness. Compare Clarksdale Rubber Co., 45 T.C. 234 (1965), and H.F.
Ramsey Co., 43 T.C. 500 (1965), with Commissioner v. Barclay Jewelry,
Inc., 367 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1966), and United States v. Fenix & Scisson,
Inc., 360 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967), and
Fawn Fashions, Inc., 41 T.C. 205 (1963). The Internal Revenue Service
considers disallowance appropriate. See Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h) (6)
(1962); Rev. Rul. 67-186, 1967 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 24, at 9.
60. Section 382(b) would not have disallowed the carryovers be-
cause all the corporations were "owned substantially by the same per-
sons in the same proportion." Section 382(b) (3).
61. Commentators sympathetic to loss carryover transferability ad-
vocated a narrow reading of Libson Shops. See, e.g., Arent, Current
Developments Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 TAXEs 956 (1957);
Levine & Petta, Libson Shops: A Study in Semantics, 36 TAXES 445
(1958); Sinrich, Libson Shops-An Argument Against Its Application
Under the 1954 Code, 13 TAx L. REv. 167 (1958). Later articles have
reluctantly predicted that Libson Shops will be given a far broader
interpretation. See Speiller, Acquisitions by Loss Corporations of Profit-
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The Internal Revenue Service apparently agrees. It first an-
nounced that it would not apply Libson Shops to transactions
expressly covered by section 381,62 and that it would not apply
the continuity of business test to any post-1954 transaction if
there "has been little or no change in the stock ownership of
the corporation during or after the period in which the losses
were incurred .... 6 Following a particularly unsettling defeat
in the Ninth Circuit,6 4 however, the Service retreated somewhat,
announcing that it will apply the "fundamental type of statu-
tory analysis" found in Libson Shops to post-1954 cases. The
Libson Shops "rationale" will be applied, according to this later
ruling, "where there has been both a fifty per cent shift in the
benefits of a loss carryover .. . and a change in business as
defined in section 382 (a) and the regulations thereunder."'65
What this ruling means, of course, is that the Commissioner
wishes Libson Shops to plug the leaks in sections 269 and 382 (a).
Two recent cases graphically illustrate why the Commissioner
feels need for this added weapon. In each case, however, the
court of appeals rejected his position.
In Maxwell Hardware Company v. Commissioner,0 a poten-
tially profitable real estate development was transferred to an
old but failing hardware corporation. The owners of the real
estate business received preferred stock in the hardware com-
pany and, pursuant to a complex agreement, the common stock
was placed in a voting trust. The right to manage each business
remained with its original unrelated owners; real estate profits
were tied to the preferred stock and hardware profits to the
common. The agreement was to terminate and the businesses to
separate when the development was completed. Although the
owners of the development had good reason to incorporate their
able Businesses, 40 TAXEs 22 (1962). See also Advisory Group Hearings
568.
62. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 147.
63. Rev. Rul 63-40, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 46, 47. Questions posed
to the Service involved whether carryovers would survive if a loss
corporation after 1954 purchased assets of a profit corporation (partly
with cash contributed by its shareholders), sold its former assets, and
continued the new business, and whether the result would change if
profit corporation's stock were purchased and profit corporation were
immediately liquidated. The Service held that carryovers would survive
in either case.
64. Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Comnissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th
Cir. 1965).
65. T.I.R. No. 773 (Oct. 13, 1965) (emphasis added).
66. 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'g sub nom. Arthur T. Beckett,
41 T.C. 386 (1963).
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risky venture, their choice of the hardware corporation was ob-
viously motivated by the latter's substantial loss carryover.
Nevertheless, sections 269 and 382(a) were technically inappli-
cable because there had not been an acquisition or a change in
ownership6 7 -owners of the loss corporation retained possession
of all common stock. The Tax Court, relying squarely on Lib-
son Shops, denied the carryover of prior hardware losses to post-
unification real estate income, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
That court first held that Libson Shops "is not controlling prece-
dent for judicial interpretation" of the 1954 Code because the
result in Libson Shops would have been different under the new
statute. It also ruled that neither section 382(a), nor section
269, nor section 482"8 was applicable to disallow the carryover
in question. Finally, the court of appeals rejected the Commis-
sioner's argument that the carryover should be disallowed under
some nonstatutory "judge-made" rule governing loss carryover
transferability:
An expression like 'trafficking in loss carryovers' is a question-
begging epithet which clouds reason. A dispassionate considera-
tion of the 1954 Code must lead to the conclusion, we believe,
that Congress has deliberately sanctioned such so-called 'traf-
ficking' in those situations where it is not expressly abjured.60
The taxpayer was equally successful in Jackson Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. United States.70 General Motors' (GM) lending division
finances its franchised automobile dealers by supplying up to
three-fourths of their needed capital in exchange for all class A,
voting common stock of a proposed dealer corporation. The in-
dividual dealer is given management of the enterprise and class
B, nonvoting common for his cash investment. If the dealership
is successful, profits must be used to buy up GM's class A com-
mon; thus, eventually the dealer becomes sole owner. In this
case, a Colorado Buick dealership failed before GM stock had
been significantly retired. GM bought up the dealer's interest
and closed operations. Three years later, the corporation was
refinanced by GM and a new Georgia Oldsmobile dealer; the
name was changed and the business continued as a Georgia
67. But see note 56 supra.
68. Section 482 provides that the Commissioner may allocate deduc-
tions among two or more commonly controlled businesses if such
allocation "is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly
to reflect the income" of the businesses. Like § 269, it is a provision of
general application, but it is seldom if ever relevant to loss carryover
cases.
69. 343 F.2d at 719.




enterprise with entirely different management and employees.
When it proved profitable, the corporation attempted to offset
prior Colorado losses against its income. The District Court
found sections 269 and 382(a) inapplicable because GM had at
all times retained ownership of voting stock. The taxpayer con-
tended that Libson Shops did not apply to transactions after 1954.
Avoiding this question, the district court held that Libson Shops
did not bar carryovers because prior cases had applied the
change of business rationale to a single corporation only when
there was no continuity of ownership. Thus, the taxpayer pre-
vailed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in a short opinion.
Although certiorari was not authorized in either Maxwell
Hardware or Jackson Oldsmobile, the Commissioner does not
acquiesce in either decision.71 Thus, as happened just prior to
New Colonial and then Libson Shops, a serious conflict between
the courts of appeals and the Commissioner appears to be brew-
ing which only the Supreme Court or Congress can resolve.
Even in those areas where the courts and the Commissioner
are in apparent accord, the current law presents a confusing
array of doctrines. Depending upon the transaction at issue, the
test for loss carryover survival may be tax avoidance purpose
(section 269), continuity of ownership (section 382 (b)), continu-
ity of business (assuming some vitality for Libson Shops), or
continuity of ownership and business (section 382 (a)). Also, the
carryover may be disallowed in whole or in part, depending
upon the applicable provision, with additional variations in the
manner of determining a partial disallowance.72 In so complex
and inconsistent a scheme, anomalies are certain to appear and
already exist, as will be shown in Part IV. Reform is badly
needed, and Congress and the courts have been bombarded with
an awesome variety of proposals. With the problem so mud-
dled, it seems necessary to return to the basic purposes behind
loss carryovers to see if principles relevant to the question of
71. See T.I.R. No. 773 (Oct. 13, 1965), as to Maxwell Hardware, and
6 P-H FEDERAL TAXEs I 56,400 (1967), as to Jackson Oldsmobile.
72. Compare § 382(b), with the treatment of loss carryovers in
the consolidated returns context, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-1(f) (1), -21(c);
1.1502-31A(b) (3) (1966). (The consolidated returns problem is treated
in greater detail in Section IV, F. infra.) In addition, the Internal Rev-
enue Service adopted a tracing test under Libson Shops for dealing with
statutory mergers under the 1939 Code, Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum.
ButL. 475, a position adopted by a number of courts. See, e.g., Foremost
Dairies, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 238 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Fla. 1963), affd per
curiam, 341 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1965).
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carryover transferability can be extracted from the averaging
concept.
III. A THEORETICAL APPROACH
The argument one frequently hears for limiting loss carry-
over transferability is that free transfer would permit persons
who did not incur the economic detriment of a net operating
loss to reap the benefits of the resulting carryover.73  But
this argument is inadequate. If it is safe to assume that Con-
gress did not and does not intend to achieve a system of averag-
ing whereby the Treasury pays out (to someone) the full tax
value of all net operating losses, the argument less justifiably
assumes that, were carryovers freely transferable, their market
value would not equal the potential tax savings they represent.
Were the market value equal or nearly equal, the "owner" of
the net operating loss would in fact reap the benefit of his
carryover, but through transfer rather than through a reduction
of taxes. As proponents of restricted transferability seldom ex-
plore this question, one suspects they fear a discomforting
answer.74 In addition, proponents of restricted transferability
tend to use this quasi-moralistic argument to support decisions
to which it simply does not apply; in Libson Shops, for example,
the people who incurred the losses were deprived of the benefits
of the carryovers, because different taxpaying entities were
technically involved. What all this means is that there is no
easy answer to the loss carryover transferability problem and
no glib rationale which can convincingly support a proposed
answer. It remains to be seen whether an arbitrary solution is
the only alternative.
An individual taxpayer (other than a nonresident alien)
may offset a net operating business loss against taxable income
from any source. Likewise, he may use a loss carryover to off-
set past or future taxable income from any source. Although an
'73. See, e.g., Advisory Group Hearings 836 (Statement of Bernard
Wolfman).
74. The market value of loss carryovers has been estimated at any-
where from 10-30% of the dollar value of the losses. Cf. Advisory
Group Hearings 840-41 (Statement of Bernard Wolfman). Commenta-
tors have suggested that even freely transferable carryovers would sell
at a significant discount because of the losing businessman's unfavor-
able bargaining position and the risk that a purchaser will fail to gener-
ate sufficient offsetting profits. See ALI, INcoME TAX PROBLEMS OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 41 (1958). Whether or not that is
true, greater certainty in the law of carryover transferability would




individual may not sell a carryover to another taxpayer, he
may raise additional capital through loans or gifts and offset
carryforwards against income derived from that capital. And he
may join a partnership and offset his share of partnership income
with his own loss carryovers.75 The previous historical survey
makes clear, however, that corporations do not enjoy so pre-
sumptively free a use of net operating loss carryovers. Certain
inherent differences between a corporation and an individual
may explain this different treatment. First, ownership of a
corporate taxpaying entity may be transferred through sale of
stock; since an individual and his "tax attributes" cannot be
sold, this adds a new dimension to the transferability of a loss
carryover. Second, a corporation has greater potential for uti-
lizing carryovers because it is usually able to expand its capital
more rapidly and to a larger extent than can an individual.
And this expansion is more likely to come from outside sources
which assume an ownership position.
There is only one provision in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 which creates a net operating loss deduction and carryover
(section 172); it applies to individuals and to corporations alike.
Therefore, the most sensible and fairest standard for developing
rules governing corporate loss carryover transferability is to
give corporations, to the greatest degree possible, the same free-
dom to "transfer" (and no more) that individual taxpayers
have.76 With this fundamental guideline, the problem is to de-
termine what additional restrictions must be imposed because of
the greater freedom to transfer inherently provided by the cor-
porate form of doing business. The problem will be approached
by hypothesizing a corporation having substantial loss carryovers
and little prospect of generating future income with its existing
operations.
75. That individuals should have such free use of loss carryovers
is not an inevitable concomitant to such a deduction. In England, for
example, prior law permitted an individual to carry forward business
losses for one year against income from unrelated sources but indefi-
nitely against subsequent income of the business that incurred a loss.
See G. WHEATCROFT, THE LAW OF INCOME TAX, SURTAX AND PROFITS TAX
ff 1-666, 1-667 (1962). However, the author accepts the present United
States law as economically and socially sound.
76. The position that corporations should have less freedom to
transfer loss carryovers than individuals seems hard to justify. That
the corporation is an inanimate "person" with fragmented ownership
makes it a less appealing entity upon which to bestow averaging
benefits. But the basic structure of our federal tax laws gives to the




A. SALE OF ASSETS
If the corporation, with no ownership change, sells its pres-
ent business and uses the proceeds to buy another, analogy to
averaging benefits conferred upon individuals dictates retention
of the carryover. In economic terms, also, it seems sound that
any taxpayer should not be discouraged from discarding a losing
venture and beginning a new business3 7 Finally, since one cor-
poration can average losses from one business with gains from
another business in the same year, does not the basic purpose
of the loss carryover require that the same averaging be per-
mitted across the tax year barrier?
Some commentators, particularly labor groups, have con-
tended that allowance of carryovers in this situation stimulates
unemployment and premature termination of businesses need-
ing only additional capital to survive.78 But the same can be
said when the carryover is allowed to an individual under these
circumstances. Whether the tax laws should act affirmatively
to discourage dissolution of unprofitable businesses (and, if so,
how) is a political question; the averaging concept as enacted
thus far has not adopted this view, and the argument seems
analytically misplaced when directed solely at restricting cor-
porate loss carryovers. The courts have not shown a propensity
to disallow carryovers in this change-of-business situation. Al-
though the doctrine of Libson Shops could arguably be so inter-
preted, neither the Treasury,7 the courts,8 0 nor the Congress s '
has adopted such an extention.
B. INVESTMNT OF ADDTONAL CAPITAL
If the loss corporation's shareholders invest additional capi-
tal to create carryover-offsetting income, should carryovers be
eliminated? The averaging concept envisions additions to capi-
tal as a means of reversing carryover-producing failures. A
contrary law might discourage rehabilitation. While the greater
77. "[T]he recoupment of a loss by the expansion or change of an
unsuccessful business is a legitimate business purpose and one which the
loss carryover provision is intended to assist." Tarleau, Acquisition of
Loss Companies, 31 TAXES 1050, 1055 (1953). See S. RuP. No. 627, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1943); Speiller, supra note 61, at 28.
78. Advisory Group Hearings 879-80 (Statement of Textile Work-
ers Union of America).
79. See Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 CuM. BuLL. 46.
80. See, e.g., Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d
713 (9th Cir. 1965).
81. Compare § 382(a).
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ability of a corporation to generate such an influx of capital has
been noted, this difference in structure between corporations and
individuals does not seem great enough to justify a different
rule as to carryover survival so long as survival furthers the pur-
pose of equitable income averaging. Finally, contributions to
capital of a modern corporation take many forms; a rule elimi-
nating carryovers in all cases would be patently unjust while a
rule attempting to isolate certain "suspect" contributions would
create uncertainties that would plague the managers of a loss
corporation.
C. CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP
The issue is more difficult when a losing corporate enter-
prise undergoes a change in ownership. The economic burden
of a net operating loss falls, it might be supposed, upon the
shareholders of a corporation. Taking this view, it is arguable
that a corporation with new owners should be equated with any
newborn business by eliminating carryovers. One question is
immediately provoked: how great a change of ownership, given
the diverse ownership of at least publicly-owned corporations,
should necessitate elimination of carryovers? Even cursory
consideration of this question forces recognition that the corpora-
tion is indeed an entity distinct from its shareholders, transfer
of which does not normally affect its independent existence.
In general, our tax laws recognize this corporate entity by leav-
ing corporate tax attributes unaltered when stock is transferred.
No one has seriously contended that carryovers should be
eliminated by minor, everyday shifts in the ownership of a pub-
licly-held corporation.82 There have been proposals, however,
to terminate carryovers after a substantial shift signifying trans-
fer of control.83 By ignoring the corporate entity, such a rule
would in some cases destroy averaging of gains and losses of a
single business enterprise. Furthermore, such a proposal serious-
ly oversimplifies economic realities: for one thing, the burden of
a net operating loss may not have "fallen" by the time of sale
on those who happened to own stock when the loss was in-
curred; or part of this loss may be recovered by sale of the
stock if carryovers are permitted to survive a transfer. More
82. Note how § 382(a)(2) prevents that statute from affecting
diversely owned corporations. See also Commercial Indus. Corp. v.
United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1669 (D.N.J. 1967).




important, emphasis on the corporation's shareholders overlooks
the impact of a net operating loss on the managers, creditors, and
employees of a corporation.8 4 These groups, who all benefit by
survival of a carryover, establish a corporate business entity inde-
pendent of the shareholder-owners, who may or may not play a
significant role in managing the enterprise. Can it fairly be said
that only the shareholders are entitled to the benefits of income
averaging through the loss carryover? Though the question is
not free from doubt, the author believes that carryovers should
not be eliminated by a change in corporate ownership alone.85
D. TERmINATION OF BusINEss AN CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP
If the loss corporation's losing enterprise is terminated and
a controlling block of its stock sold, there is no averaging principle
that requires carryovers to survive. This is the most common
form of "trafficking in loss corporations." Transfer in such cases,
regardless of whether the corporation is kept alive by the
transferee through an infusion of new assets, is in substance
identical to a sale of the loss carryover as an asset. Such sales
are not allowed to individuals nor to corporations: that the
issue is beclouded because stock is sold rather than the carryover
itself should not change the result.8
The basic principle outlined above is that change of busi-
ness or ownership alone should not affect carryovers but ter-
mination of business with change of ownership should. At this
point, the carryover transferability problem is reduced to an-
alyzing possible variants and to formulating workable rules.
Unfortunately, flexibility in modern corporate law makes these
variants innumerable. Perhaps most difficult from a theoretical
standpoint is the transaction joining two operating businesses
and its converse, a divisive reorganization. 7 If a loss corpora-
84. Note Judge Magruder's phrasing in Newmarket Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 233 F.2d 493, 497 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983
(1957).
85. This conclusion was also reached by the Advisory Group on
Subchapter C. See Advisory Group Hearings 568.
86. A purchase of stock was treated as a purchase of assets for
basis purposes when the acquired corporation was liquidated imme-
diately subsequent to the stock purchase in Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). Compare § 334
(b) (2). The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine seems applicable here.
87. It has been argued that carryovers should not survive cor-
porate combinations because tax laws should not encourage large ac-
cumulations of corporate wealth and power. See Lanning, Tax Erosion
and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 943, 951
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tion acquires a profitable business through its own capital or
that of its existing shareholders, the above analysis indicates
that, a fortiori, loss carryovers should survive. But often a
merger involves some change in the loss corporation's owner-
ship; it may also involve the combining of two enterprises un-
der completely new owners."8 Rigid application of the corporate
business entity 9 theory dictates a survival of the carryover
because the enterprise that incurred the loss has survived in
merely an expanded form. However, change of ownership has
created some carryover transferability not available to individuals
while change of business, depending on the extent, may be
tantamount to termination of the original corporate business en-
tity. Thus, carryovers should not survive all mergers. It does
not seem possible to draft a rule that will do justice to all prin-
ciples in all cases. The answer appears to turn on an assessment
of relative "dangers." Since taxpayers are free to mbnipulate
transactions as they wish, the danger of permitting carryovers to
survive mergers that are in substance a change of ownership and
a termination of the loss corporation's business seems greater
than the danger of disallowing carryovers improperly. It is both
appropriate and workable, therefore, to limit carryovers any
time ownership and business are substantially altered by a
transaction; at that point neither entity which is arguably en-
titled to averaging benefits-ownership and business-has sur-
vived to claim those benefits.90
Given such a principle in the merger situation, the question
must be faced: when a sufficiently substantial alteration of a
loss corporation occurs through merger, should carryovers be
eliminated entirely or should they survive (a) to the extent
(1960). However, since not all mergers are undesirable, an undiscrimi-
nating revenue statute is an inappropriate vehicle for accomplishing
an anti-bigness aim. See E. J. Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C,
3 TAx REviSION COMPENDIUM 1619, 1622 (House Comm. on Ways and
Means 1959).
88. A similar problem exists when a loss corporation receives new
capital in exchange for additional common stock in what may or may
not be a § 351 tax free transaction.
89. Corporate business entity as used here does not refer to the
formalistic New Colonial approach that stressed the technical "being"
of each chartered corporation; rather, a corporation is viewed as an
economic and taxpaying entity, regardless of its personage, at the time
a loss is incurred.
90. Deferred for the moment are questions of what should consti-
tute a "substantial" change of business or ownership. See Part V infra.
However, the above analysis seems clearly applicable to tax free as well
as taxable mergers. Therefore, whichever test is better, the difference
in approach in §§ 382 (a) and (b) does not make sense.
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that former owners retain an interest, or (b) to the extent that
assets of the loss corporation comprise a portion of the resultant
enterprise, or (c) to the extent that both ownership and busi-
ness continue? Interpretors of Libson Shops have assumed that
the Supreme Court laid down an assets tracing test after cor-
porate amalgamations." Though commentators have criticized
this approach on the ground that the resultant corporation is a
unified business venture and a tracing of any one constituent
is impractical,92 it might be administratively sensible to allow a
portion of prior carryovers based on the percentage of the result-
ant's net assets originally derived from the loss constitutent,93
or to base partial survival on relative ownership interests in the
resultant.
However, it is suggested that such a partial allowance is
improper. The purpose of averaging through carryovers does
not depend upon the type or amount of assets existing when a
loss was incurred. Allowance of carryovers after an alteration of
a corporate taxpayer depends upon sufficient continuity in the
taxpaying entity, whether the continuity be ownership or busi-
ness. When that continuity by definition is lacking, there
seems no reason to allow any part of a carryover to survive.
So long as the rules devised are predictable enough so that
those entitled to averaging benefits can preserve them if they so
wish, a partial disallowance rule-which would surely be complex
-seems unnecessary. 94  On the other hand, when substantial
ownership continuity exists, existence of new "equity" interests
should not justify partial disallowance given the comparable
freedom of individuals and corporations to expand business as-
91. See Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 475, 478; cases cited
note 48 supra.
92. See, e.g., Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 744
(2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965); Arent,
Current Developments Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 TAXEs 956, 963
(1957).
93. See Brown, supra note 87, at 1628-30 (allocate by net asset
basis); Note, Corporate Reorganization and Continuity of Earnings His-
tory: Some Tax Aspects, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 648, 659 (1952) (allocate ac-
cording to "assets"). See also Buffington, Carry-Overs in Reorganiza-
tions: Corporate or Tax Entity Approach, 32 TAXEs 575, 580-83 (1954),
which lists alternative methods of allocation.
94. It has been suggested that complete elimination is inequitable
to minority shareholders. See Advisory Group Hearings 570. Even if
true, it is hard to see why this group has a particularly strong claim
to averaging benefits. In this respect, the analogy to individuals must
be imperfect, and disagreement, to say nothing of arbitrariness, may be
unavoidable.
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sets through loans, gifts, and other influxes of capital without
affecting carryovers.
Whether carryovers should survive a divisive reorganiza-
tion is a somewhat different question. Although ownership
and business of each resultant will presumably differ from that
of the predecessor, most of the original owners will probably
retain the same total financial interest. As ownership of the
total losing enterprise is not changed by such a divisive reor-
ganization, it seems analogous to an individual's disposing of
one of two operations, and carryovers should survive. But
while the divisive reorganization is not an abuse of the averag-
ing concept, it does complicate matters because each resultant
is owned by at least some of the original owners. To insure
that each group of loss corporation shareholders in fact receives
a proportionate benefit from the carryover, allocation of the
carryover now seems unavoidable. Earnings and profits have
been allocated after such reorganizations,9 5 so the task should
not prove insurmountable. Unlike earnings and profits, how-
ever, the loss carryover is a beneficial tax attribute, and the
allocation rules would surely have to be different.9 0
E. CONCLUSION
The above analysis as a whole would seem to provide a sound
95. See, e.g., Estate of Howard H. McClintic, 47 B.T.A. 188 (1942).
The conclusion that allocation is appropriate only in the divisive re-
organization situation was reached, after analysis based upon tax free
reorganization provisions, in Buffington, supra note 93, at 582.
96. Since it is ownership continuity which warrants carryover sur-
vival in this situation, the aim should be an allocation method which
distributes the carryover so that each shareholder retains the benefit
of an equitable proportion. Two allocation formulas come to mind:
Carryover allocated to a resultant Investment In resultant by loss
corporation owners
Total pre-reorganization carryover Investment in loss corporation
before division
or
Carryover allocated Net fair market value of assets received by resultant
Total carryover Net fair market value of loss corporation assets before
division
Neither formula allows for shareholders eliminated during the division,
but that seems unavoidable; hopefully, knowledge that the carryovers
will survive would increase the amount they realize upon elimination.
Whatever the allocation formula, if any resultant underwent, either
pursuant or subsequent to a divisive reorganization, change of business
(which is nearly always present) and substantial infusion of new own-
ers, its portion of the carryovers should be eliminated as in other
situations.
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and consistent theoretical framework in which to solve prob-
lems of corporate loss carryover transferability. But an acid
test remains-application of these principles to actual problems.
For this purpose, a number of situations troublesome under
present law have been selected for further analysis. With each,
the "correct" theoretical solution will be sought, but within the
framework of the 1954 Code, both to illustrate problems under
that statute and to suggest ways in which it can be interpreted
to provide the most consistent approach possible to the loss
carryover transferability issue.
IV. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS UNDER THE 1954 CODE
A. SINGLE CORPORATION TRANSACTIONS
Section 381 of the 1954 Code covers a number of situations
in which a single loss corporation alters its structure in such a
way that loss carryovers have been "transferred." Section 381
links carryover inheritance to tax free transactions. Although
survival of other tax attributes is often made to depend upon
whether a transaction is tax free, this factor seems irrelevant
to loss carryover transferability. Survival of corporate carry-
overs should depend upon business or ownership continuity;
these can be altered as greatly in a tax free transfer as in some
that are taxableY7 Nevertheless, section 381 often produces a
theoretically desirable result. The clearest example is that of
a section 368 (a) (1) (F) reorganization, a "mere change in iden-
tity, form, or place of organization, however effected. s98 Since
continuity of ownership and business remain, section 381 prop-
erly overrules cases harshly disallowing carryovers on author-
ity of New Colonial.9
Section 381 omits reference to the section 368 (a) (1) (E) or
recapitalization reorganization, presumably for the same unex-
97. See Advisory Group Hearings 838 (Statement of Bernard
Wolfman). Certain tax attributes, such as the basis of assets acquired
in a (C) reorganization, must survive if tax deferral rather than tax
reduction is to result. Others, such as earnings and profits after an
(F) reorganization, should survive if the tax balance sheet is to balance.
Neither argument for linking survival to tax free status is pertinent
to loss carryovers.
98. In Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957 Cum. BULL. 126, the Treasury an-
nounced that, for purposes of § 381, an (F) reorganization that also fits
the definition of other § 368 reorganization provisions will be treated
as an (F) reorganization. This is significant for questions of carry-
backs and tax year determinations. Compare Estate of Stauffer, 48
T.C. 277 (1967).




pressed reason that insolvency reorganizations were omitted.1 00
This is unfortunate. While a recapitalization often involves a
significant change of equity ownership, the business entity usu-
ally remains unchanged. If the foregoing theoretical analysis is
sound, carryovers should survive.10 ' In the New Colonial era,
carryovers often survived a recapitalization simply because the
corporate entity survived. A recent case under the 1939 Code
casts doubt on this doctrine,' 02 and omission of (E) reorganiza-
tions from section 381 may prompt courts to decide that Congress
intended a different result than with (F) reorganizations. Hope-
fully, however, carryovers will be permitted to survive.
Section 381 (a) (1) permits the loss carryforwards 0 3 of an
eighty per cent controlled subsidiary to survive a section 332
tax free liquidation of the subsidiary, except when the basis of
assets received is determined under section 334(b) (2). The
intent of this provision is sound. Although there is normally a
change of business upon a "merger" through liquidation, liqui-
dation of a controlled subsidiary involves no more than a minor
change of ownership and carryovers of the subsidiary should
not be affected. Section 334(b) (2), on the other hand, involves
a liquidation within two years of acquisition of a subsidiary's
stock. In this situation, assuming the subsidiary is a loss cor-
poration, 0 4 there has been within a short period of time a
change of ownership and business, and carryovers should be
eliminated.
100. See pp. 607-10 infra. The reason for this omission is puzzling.
Since carryovers had been allowed after some insolvency recapitaliza-
tions, see, e.g., In re Kepp Elec. & Mfg. Co., 98 F. Supp. 51 (D. Minn.
1951), Congress might have thought recapitalization, which involves
no change of corporate entity, did not require explicit conferral of carry-
over survival. See Germain, Carryovers in Corporate Acquisitions, 15
TAx L. REV. 35, 40 (1959). Compare Rev. :Rul. 54-482, 1954-2 Cum. BULL.
148, allowing carryovers after (E) reorganizations under the 1939 Code.
On the other hand, omitting (E) reorganizations may be related to the
traditional harsh view of carryovers after insolvency reorganizations
illustrated by New Colonial.
A more likely explanation, assuming no oversight, is that § 381
requires survival of certain tax attributes, such as earnings and profits,
that should not survive all recapitalizations; thus, Congress chose to
leave carryovers to fend for themselves under prior law.
101. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
102. Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 828 (1961).
103. For a discussion of 1954 Code rules as to carrybacks, see
pp. 610-12 infra.
104. Section 381 (a) (1) deals only with cases where the liquidated
company possessed the loss carryover. If the profit corporation is liqui-




While section 381 (a) (1) essentially adopts the change-of-
ownership and change-of-business standards for carryover sur-
vival, it unfortunately contains errors of omission. For instance,
a liquidation that fails to comply with the technical requirements
of section 332,105 but involves essentially liquidation of a long-
controlled loss corporation subsidiary, should not result in elimi-
nation of carryovers; regardless of the tax consequences of the liq-
uidation, continuity of loss corporation ownership exists. Con-
versely, a liquidation which avoids the technicalities of section 334
(b) (2), a fairly easy thing to do, should nevertheless result in
elimination of loss carryovers, whether or not section 332 is
applicable, if it involves in substance changes of ownership and
business within a short period of time.
To summarize, the substance of each liquidation should be
assessed in terms of basic loss carryover principles regardless of
what other tax rules attend the liquidation. Since section 381
treats many liquidations of loss corporations appropriately and
obviously does not explicitly cover all of them, enlightened ju-
dicial interpretation could achieve sound results in most cases.
This belief, to be repeated throughout the discussion in this
Part, stems mainly from a conviction that the many gaps in sec-
tions 381 and 382 compel a conclusion that Congress anticipated
survival of some flexible "common law" as to loss carryover
transferability. By eliminating the statutory reference to "the
taxpayer" and by stating its preference for realistic economic
analysis, Congress should be deemed to have rejected the com-
mon law of the New Colonial period. The most rational substi-
tute is not the congressionally unpredicted and economically
questionable doctrine of Libson Shops, but rather rules which
decide cases not expressly governed by sections 381 and 382 in a
manner consistent with the purposes behind those provisions. 10 6
Section 382(a), applicable when a change of ownership of
a loss corporation occurs by "purchase" (defined as an acquisi-
tion of stock in which basis is determined by the purchaser's
cost),107 eliminates carryovers entirely if ownership has changed
105. Distribution in complete cancellation of stock must occur
within a taxable year or within three years if the plan of liquidation
calls for a series of redemptions. Section 332 (b).
106. It should be noted that the unfortunate § 382(b) standard is
not applicable to liquidations covered by § 381 (a) (1). Therefore, it
is peculiarly logical in this situation to apply the more general change
of ownership plus change of business standard, proposed in Part III
and codified to a limited extent in § 382(a), to liquidations of loss
corporations not specifically covered by § 381.
107. Section 382(a) (4).
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significantly (determined by an elaborate objective test) and if
there has been a "substantial" change in business. If the conclu-
sions of Part III are accepted, the standards set forth in this
provision are basically sound.
Section 382 (a) litigation has usually involved the elusive
change-of-business requirement, which Treasury Regulations and
congressional history have both attempted to define. It was sug-
gested in Part III that continuity of the business entity should
prevent elimination of carryovers after a substantial change in
ownership of a loss corporation. However, given a substantial
change of ownership, the danger or abuse of the corporate loss
carryover is real, while the ability to control events lies with
the taxpayer. Under these circumstances, the standard appar-
ently envisioned by the Supreme Court in Libson Shops seems
appropriate: has the business as constituted when losses were
incurred been significantly altered? :Reasonable leeway must be
permitted so that new owners may rehabilitate a failing enter-
prise. Thus, a change in location, the Senate committee report
notwithstanding,10 should often be permissible. But any signifi-
cant change in character of the business, including addition of a
major new trade or business now permitted by the Regulations, 10 9
should result in elimination of carryovers. 1 0
Between them, sections 381 and 382 cover many types of
108. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 284-86 (1954).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (h) (8) (1962).
110. Existing case law interpreting § 382 (a) (1) (C) seems gener-
ally sound. In Wallace Corp., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 43 (1964), the
new owners moved offices, switched personnel, streamlined production,
and bought new machinery. All these activities are consistent with
rehabilitation of the losing business, and carryovers were permitted.
In Koppers Co. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Pa. 1964), carry-
overs were allowed when new owners continued the losing business
but purchased raw materials from a new source, one that they con-
trolled. This, too, does not affect business continuity. However, when a
losing business was recontinued after a long termination, or when only
a minor portion of the original enterprise survived transfer and addi-
tion of a new venture, carryovers were properly disallowed. See Euclid-
Tennessee, Inc., 41 T.C. 752 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1965);
Fawn Fashions, Inc., 41 T.C. 205 (1963). Compare Clarksdale Rubber
Co., 45 T.C. 234 (1965). A hard case was Goodwyn Crockery Co., 37
T.C. 355 (1961), af-'d, 315 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963), where the losing
business was wholesaling durable household goods. New owners were
dry goods wholesalers, and they had petitioner buy a dry goods com-
pany and also expand into retailing. However, the old venture, re-
vitalized, was continued. The question should perhaps turn on how
much capital was supplied by the new owners to make these changes,
i.e., whether in substance a merger was effected. Carryovers were
allowed on the ground that only a new trade was added. This test
seems inadequate but the case itself is close.
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single corporation alterations. However, a number of situations
fall outside these specific provisions. Blatant examples of such
omissions are section 351 tax free transfers to a controlled cor-
poration (or any exchange of an individual's assets for stock),"'
and situations such as Maxwell Hardware, Jackson Oldsmo-
bile, and Glover Packing, which arguably avoid technical change
of ownership requirements in section 382 (a) .- 12 It is not clear
what principles Congress intended the courts to apply in such
situations. The problem is complicated because judicial rules
under the 1939 Code changed radically after 1954, primarily due
to Libson Shops.
Libson Shops involved a merger situation now covered under
section 381; the Supreme Court there reached a result in con-
flict with congressional rules formulated in sections 381 and 382
(b). Therefore, the Treasury and commentators seem correct in
refusing to apply the Libson Shops change-of-business approach
to section 381 transfers. Likewise, Libson Shops is not in har-
mony with section 382(a), and courts should not alter that sec-
tion by adding a Libson Shops gloss to transactions that it covers.
It might be argued that, since Congress in 1954 was faced with
the absolute rule of New Colonial, carryovers should be elimi-
nated in cases not within the ambit of sections 381 and 382.
But this seems absurd in the case of single corporation altera-
tions: New Colonial never had such broad application." 3 On
the other hand, the court of appeals in Maxwell Hardware indi-
cated that all carryovers should survive unless barred by section
269 or section 382. But this view ignores the framework of ju-
dicial resistance to carryover transferability within which Con-
gress operated in 1954, and the obvious omissions and anomalies
in the 1954 Code provisions. In substance, the 1954 Code altered
specific prior doctrines (overruling New Colonial, Stanton Brew-
ery, and Alprosa), though of course in fairly broad language.
Too many situations were ignored to permit a conclusion that
this was a comprehensive specific statute. The answer, as one
might suspect and as the Commissioner appears to suggest in
111. Cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 46 T.C. 698 (1966). It is
assumed that a corporation may always purchase new assets for cash
without affecting its carryovers.
112. The Glover Packing decision, see text accompanying notes 55-56
supra, which foiled a flagrant attempt to circumvent § 382(a), seems
clearly correct. An expansive reading of § 382(a) (1) is preferable to
the approach in Maxwell Hardware, where the Tax Court and the court
of appeals rather passively abandoned that provision and the congres-
sional purpose it manifests.
113. See, e.g., Northway Sec. Co., 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931).
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a recent ruling,114 seems somewhere in between: Congress
must have anticipated some "common law" (or common sense)
of loss carryover transferability to govern situations not covered
by statute.
However, as the Commissioner recognizes, it does not neces-
sarily follow that Libson Shops is the proper common law ap-
proach for the 1954 Code. Congressional principles in the 1954
Code should be the basis of this common law; Libson Shops, for
many reasons, simply bears no relation to 1954 statutory prin-
ciples. The most far-reaching expression of congresssional pur-
pose in the 1954 Code seems to be the change-of-business-change-
of-ownership definition of trafficking in loss corporations found
in section 382(a). It is contended that this test should be ap-
plied to all single corporation cases outside specific coverage of
sections 269, 381, and 382. As to this aspect of the loss carryover
problem, this approach agrees with the present position of the
Internal Revenue Service.
Having suggested a general approach to single corporation
cases, a moment should be spent on the facts of Maxwell Hard-
ware" 5 and Jackson Oldsmobile."6 It is true that there was no
change of equity ownership in either case and that therefore sec-
tion 382(a) was apparently inapplicable." 7 In addition, there
was no acquisition of control within the meaning of section 269
and no section 381 tax free transaction. Thus, the broad question
in each case was whether the court could properly go beyond the
confines of these provisions and seek a more general congres-
sional intent from the structure and language of sections 172,
381, and 382. This is never an easy question; if anything it is
harder than usual in the taxation realm. But with this problem,
we can know with fair certainty that Congress desired that at
least section 382 (a) be all-inclusive. Given the general preoccu-
pation with economic realities in 1954, this seems reason enough
to apply the standard of that section to cases within its iden-
tifiable scope of application.
Framed in this manner, the Maxwell Hardware decision was
wrong. The owners of the hardware business had no control
and little share in the profits of the real estate venture. They
in fact gained no more than technical and temporary ownership
114. T.I.R. No. 773 (Oct. 13, 1965).
115. 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).
116. 237 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1964), affd, 371 F.2d 808 (5th
Cir. 1967).
117. But see note 56 supra.
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of the profit enterprise. It does not even seem necessary to
measure their relative share of the resultant to conclude that a
carryover of hardware losses to real estate income involved a
substantial change in ownership continuity. The change in
business was obvious; carryovers should not have survived.
Even conceding some judicial leeway to broaden the scope of
section 382 (a), Jackson Oldsmobile was a difficult case. A
change of business did occur, but equity ownership remained
the same. The question is whether change of management com-
bined with a change in potential ownership if the new business
proves profitable constitutes a sufficient change in the taxpaying
entity. This is a perplexing question of fact inadequately an-
alyzed by a district judge whose abstract discussion of applicable
legal principles was in many ways laudable. On the one hand,
GM assumed ownership of the corporation mainly to insure re-
covery of its loan to the dealer (and to gain an outlet for its
cars). Because GM's return was limited, greatest benefit from
the carryovers flowed to the new Georgia owner; GM profited
by allowance only in that its loan was repaid faster (unless the
Georgia dealership proved profitable for only a short period).
On the other hand, GM made the principal capital investment
and was, for business reasons, legal owner during the period in
question. Probably this is not a case where equity ownership
should have been ignored; thus, carryovers were properly al-
lowed.
The foregoing discussion has intentionally omitted signifi-
cant reference to section 269. The author feels that a taxpayer's
state of mind should be irrelevant to all tax questions except, of
course, those of fraud and criminal conduct. Provisions like sec-
tion 269 seem essentially admissions that Congress and the courts
cannot be relied upon to enact and to interpret an effective
revenue law."" Furthermore, section 269 should not disallow
118. See Cohen, Tax Avoidance Purpose as a Statutory Test in Tax
Legislation, Tuin. 9th ANN. TAx INST. 229 (1960). The Commissioner's
victories under § 129 and § 269 almost invariably have involved change
of ownership and change of business. Only Huddle, Inc., 20 CCH Tax
Ct. Mern. 745 (1961), arguably did not involve a change of business.
However, emphasizing taxpayer intent has led to some strained analysis
in cases in which carryovers would obviously be disallowed under a
change-of-ownership-change-of-business test. See H.F. Ramsey Co., 43
T.C. No. 42 (1965); Jeremiah 3. O'Donnell, Jr., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
232 (1964). And a rule under which only the ignorant prevail seems
patently absurd. An interesting case is Brick Milling Co., 32 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1824 (1963), where the Tax Court held that donation of the
stock of a loss corporation to another controlled corporation falls under
the "acquisition of control" test in § 269(a) (1). Under a comprehensive
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carryovers when a loss corporation purchases a new business
partially to utilize its own existing carryovers," 9 not because
the purpose is only in part tax oriented, but because the averaging
concept is not violated. 2
0
B. UNmFYmG TRANSACTIONS
A major change accomplished by Congress in section 381 was
replacement of the New Colonial-Stanton Brewery uncertainties
and formalisms with an economic test of carryforward transfer-
ability after tax free unifying reorganizations. Although pres-
ent statutory doctrines are certainly an improvement over prior
case law, the economic test established by section 382(b) is un-
desirable.1 2 ' To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical
situations: (1) Individual A owns one hundred per cent of the
stock of loss corporation (L) and sixty per cent of profit corpora-
tion (P), while individual B owns the remaining forty per cent of
P. L's assets have been sold to pay debts, and A now wishes to
merge P and L so as to utilize L's loss carryover. B is willing to
gain the carryover benefit, but he will block the merger unless he
can retain a forty per cent interest in the resultant. If a statutory
merger (section 368 (a) (1) (A) reorganization) takes place ac-
cording to B's wishes, section 382(b) will disallow L's entire
carryover (whether P or L is technically the acquiring corpora-
tion) because A will not then own any stock in the resultant
"as the result of [A's] owning stock" in L "immediately before
the reorganization."'1
22
(2) The facts are the same as above except that B owns
forty per cent of L as well as forty per cent of P. Now if P and L
undergo a statutory merger, all of L's carryover will survive
because of the exception in section 382(b) (3) for cases where
change of ownership test, carryovers should survive: in effect, though
not in fact, shareholders of the loss corporation have fed in a large
amount of new capital. Perhaps the taxpayer should lose for struc-
turing his transaction so badly, but the Tax Court's use of § 269 in this
case seems indefensible. (Note: the case also involved redemption of
an independently owned one-half interest in the loss corporation, a
potential ground for disallowance under a comprehensive change of
ownership test.)
119. That this is a common business practice is apparent. See, e.g.,
Little, Why Companies Sell Out, FORTUNE, Feb., 1956, at 117, 118; Mur-
phy, Sonnabend's Sackful, FORTUNE, Sept., 1958, at 133.
120. See note 77 supra.
121. The author has not analyzed the specific mechanical restric-
tions placed on carryovers in § 381(c) (1).
122. Compare Commonwealth Container Corp., 48 T.C. 483 (1967),
discussed p. 583 supra.
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"the transferor corporation and the acquiring corporation are
owned substantially by the same persons in the same propor-
tion."
(3) Now assume that A owns one hundred per cent of L and
B owns one hundred per cent of P. After statutory merger, A
owns twenty per cent and B owns eighty per cent of the resultant
(which is comprised of P's assets and L's carryover). Section
382 (b) has been satisfied; the entire carryover will be allowed
unless the Commissioner can successfully attack the transaction
under section 269.123
The preceding theoretical discussion should have made clear
that the above hypothetical situations pose difficult problems,
but the author submits that section 382(b) does not supply ra-
tional answers. Hypothetical (2) involves no change of owner-
ship; the question is whether business owners should be able to
realign their taxpaying entities so as to reap averaging benefits
which they would have had had they structured the businesses
properly in the first place. Libson Shops and its progeny1 24
thought disallowance proper, but the author agrees with the 1954
Congress that carryovers should survive.
Hypothetical (1) adds a forty per cent change of ownership
to the problem raised by (2). The argument for disallowance is
clearly far stronger, but the "as the result of" test in section
382(b) fails to focus upon the extent of the total ownership
change in the loss corporation. Hence, section 382(b) must pro-
duce anomalous results, at least if one agrees that total owner-
ship change is the relevant criterion. If hypothetical (1) were
governed by the standards of section 382 (a) (1), then L's carry-
overs would have survived because the ownership change was
only forty per cent. There has been no justification put forth for
the historically unexplained1 2 addition of a different standard
in section 382 (b) to control tax free transactions.
Section 382(b) errs on the side of leniency in hypothetical
(3). Here is a clear attempt by A to sell his carryover to B.
That A retains twenty per cent ownership interest "as the result
123. There is a difference of opinion as to whether § 269 can be
applied to transactions within the objective standards of §§ 381 and
382(b). See note 40 supra. Compare Brick Milling Co., 32 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1824 (1963).
124. See Frank Ix & Sons Virginia Corp. v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d
867 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3158 (Oct. 17, 1967).
125. The Senate in 1954 added § 382(b). Its committee report gave




of" a tax free sale should not affect whether the carryover sur-
vives. Of course, the more stock A owns in the resultant, the
stronger his argument for carryover survival. At some point, A
will acquire enough ownership in the resultant to provide suffi-
cient "continuity" of ownership. But twenty per cent continuity
seems far too low to justify survival; hence section 382 (b) has
again produced an irrational variation from the fifty per cent
change of ownership standard of section 382 (a).
Turning to more specific problems, some commentators have
criticized the omission of (B) reorganizations from the ambit of
section 381.126 However, the (B) reorganization by itself is
merely a change of ownership. Under the author's approach,
carryovers should survive unless: (a) original owners of the loss
corporation retain a small enough interest in whatever entity
results so that in effect there has been a substantial change of
ownership, and either (b) the loss corporation is merged into
another through liquidation subsequent to such (B) reorganiza-
tion, or (c) sufficient new assets are promptly fed into the loss
corporation to comprise a substantial change of business. It is
doubtful that either transaction would survive unscathed under
the 1954 Code.127
Another error on the side of leniency in section 382(b) per-
mits carryovers to survive if the original loss corporation own-
ers receive a twenty per cent interest in the resultant through
voting preferred stock, essentially a fixed obligation argued one
commentator. 28 As in other areas of federal tax law, allowance
may or may not be proper in a particular case. The core of
this problem lies, in the author's opinion, in trying to enact
specific objective rules defining change of ownership in terms
of formal rights attending a class of stock rather than in terms
of economic interests the security represents. Because section
382(b) is less flexible than corporate law, undesirable reliance
on section 269 may be necessary to curb abuses.
C. DiVIsIVE REORGANIZATIONS
Congress intentionally1 29 omitted divisive, section 368 (a) (1)
126. See Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Busi-
ness-II, 108 U. PA. L. Rsv. 943, 960-61 (1960).
127. The Regulations treat the former situation as a (C) reorgani-
zation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.381 (a) -1(b) (2); cf. Rev. Rul. 57-53, 1957-1
Cum. BULL. 291, and the Commissioner would no doubt have a carry-
over-limiting answer for the latter.
128. See ALI, INcomE TAX PROBLEMS OF CoRPoRATIoNs AiN SHARE-
HOLDERS 341-48 (1958).
129. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
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(D) reorganizations from section 381, leaving such transactions
to fend for themselves under prior law with perhaps a pre-
sumption of nonsurvival because of pointed statutory omission.130
It may be that Congress wanted no part of any rule requiring
allocation of this beneficial tax attribute: the Supreme Court
intimated in Commissioner v. Phipps'3 1 that earnings and profits
are allocated only to preserve revenue-producing dividend char-
acterization. Another reason for omitting divisives from section
381 may be that some section 381 attributes are not suited to
allocation.
Although there is apparently only one reported case involv-
ing divisive reorganizations under prior statutes, 132 that loss
carryovers should, in theory, survive some divisive reorganiza-
tions has already been noted. In addition, the tracing implica-
tions of Libson Shops, which can certainly be relevant to cases
not covered by the 1954 provisions, are some further authority
for adoption of an allocation formula. While it is not irrational
to conclude that all divisive reorganizations involve sufficient
change in continuity of a loss corporation to warrant carryover
elimination, Congress has not clearly taken such a stand. In
terms of general principles derivable from 1954 Code provisions,
an allocation doctrine, to be judicially developed along lines ten-
tatively set forth in Part III, seems the preferable solution.
D. INsoLVENcY REORGANIZATIONS
A large number of cases, including New Colonial, have dealt
with the question of loss carryover survival after an insolvency
reorganization. There are two basic methods of accomplishing
such a reorganization: recapitalization of the insolvent corpora-
tion, or merger of the insolvent into a newly created corporation
having a different capital structure. Either method may be
accomplished by court order pursuant to Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.133  Under the New Colonial doctrine, carryovers
would not survive if the latter method was adopted but would
if there were a mere recapitalization. 1 34  Even after Stanton
130. The status of earnings and profits after a divisive reorganization
is governed elsewhere in the Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-10(c)
(1967). As to other § 381 attributes, prior law should be controlling.
See B. BiTTErt, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPoRATIoNs AND SHARE-
HOLDFRS 38 (1959).
131. 336 U.S. 410, 416-19 (1949). Compare § 312(i); Treas. Reg. §
1.312-10(c) (1960).
132. Central Nat'l Bank, 29 B.T.A. 530 (1933).
133. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1950). See especially § 616(10).
134. See Mandell, How Chapter X Reorganizations Affect the Net
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Brewery, insolvency mergers fared poorly because they gener-
ally did not fulfill requirements of a statutory merger under
state law.3 5 Two major criticisms can be levelled at these de-
cisions. First, hinging carryover survival on the form of an in-
solvency reorganization seems absurd. The bankruptcy laws au-
thorize alternative modes of reorganization to simplify prior law
and to provide flexibility. 136 Substantively, there is little inher-
ent difference whether the old corporation survives a bankruptcy
proceeding. By treating only recapitalizations favorably, the
tax laws discourage desired flexibility. 13 7 Second, a general rule
eliminating carryovers is unfortunate. An insolvency reorganiza-
tion is basically a reshuffling of ownership. But even that
change may be more imaginary than real. Creditors of an in-
solvent corporation, who often inherit ownership, already have,
at the time of reorganization, at least an inchoate equitable in-
terest in the corporation's assets. And if it cannot be said that
they have an equity interest in the corporation prior to reor-
ganization, at least the economic interest of the stockholders
has been greatly reduced by insolvency. Furthermore, credi-
tors who must assume post-reorganization ownership are per-
sons who suffered the economic detriment of prior losses. Fi-
nally, if one gives validity to the "help dying business" argu-
ments of groups such as the AFL-CIO, carryovers should cer-
tainly survive an insolvency reorganization.
Congress omitted reference to insolvency reorganizations in
section 381 of the 1954 Code. Section 381 (a) (2) provides for
the survival of carryovers in some reorganizations "to which
section 361 [relating to nonrecognition of gain or loss to cor-
porations] applies." Insolvency reorganizations are specifically
governed by sections 371-374.. 38 Section 371 sets forth operating
rules in many ways similar to section 361; since some insol-
Operating Loss Deduction, 28 TAXES 1059 (1950); Rev. Rul. 54-482, 1954-
2 Cum. BULL. 148.
135. Compare Wabash R.R. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 226 (Ct.
Cl. 1958), with Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. United States, 296 F.2d 750
(Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
136. See Krantz, Loss Carryovers in Chapter X Reorganizations, 16
TAx L. REV. 359, 363 (1961).
137. Carryovers are not, of course, the only tax considerations rele-
vant in planning an insolvency reorganization. Whether gain or loss
will be recognized, whether discharge of indebtedness will be consid-
ered income to the corporation, and whether assets will receive a carry-
over basis may, in some cases, be of paramount concern. Id. at 409.
138. Sections 373 and 374 pertain to railroad reorganizations; a spe-




vency reorganizations could meet requirements of sections 368
and 361 if section 371 were not controlling, some commentators
have speculated whether the similarity of sections 361 and 371
would justify application of section 381 to all section 371 insol-
vency reorganizations; or whether at least those insolvency re-
organizations which could satisfy section 361 should be deemed
to fall within section 381.139
Certainly, any court would be hardpressed to answer either
question affirmatively. 140 And problems would arise if section
381 were applicable to insolvencies. First, the successor to an
insolvency reorganization would then inherit tax attributes other
than loss carryovers. A deficit in earnings and profits, for ex-
ample, would survive, and it has been strongly argued that, be-
cause the capital account is restructured in an insolvency reor-
ganization, such a deficit should be reduced or eliminated. 14 1
Second, if section 381 applies, section 382(b) must be satisfied;
since shareholders of the insolvent are often replaced by bond-
holders, the requisite twenty per cent continuity of ownership
will be lacking unless, under section 382 (b) (3), bondholders are
interpreted as "owning" the insolvent prior to reorganization.
One commentator concluded that because of these difficulties sec-
tions 381 and 382 cannot produce appropriate results and that
congressional relief is needed.142
While a specific statute might be best, it need not be the
only answer. As with divisive and (E) reorganizations, omis-
sion from section 381 should not preclude a judicial decision that
purposes of section 172 are best served by allowing carryovers to
survive insolvency reorganizations. 143 This decision is difficult
to reach because prior law disallowed carryovers except in some
cases of recapitalization and because tax free alterations should
arguably be governed solely by sections 381 and 382 (b). How-
ever, the outlook for imaginative judicial treatment permitting
carryovers may be brighter here than in the case of divisive re-
organizations: there is no unfavorable legislative history as to
insolvency reorganizations; prior law permitted carryovers to
139. See Krantz, supra note 136, at 363-67.
140. Not all insolvency reorganizations would qualify under § 368.
See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
141. See Krantz, supra note 136, at 407-10.
142. Id. at 409. The Advisory Group on Subchapter C did not take
a firm stand as to insolvency reorganizations, merely recommending
that consideration be given "as a policy matter" to extending § 381. See
Advisory Group Hearings 565.
143. Here, too, however, ownership and business may be changed so
drastically in a particular transaction that carryovers should not survive.
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survive insolvency recapitalizations arguably beyond the scope
of section 381 and it would be anomalous to continue artifical
distinctions;14 4 and equities more strongly support carryover sur-
vival after an insolvency reorganization.
A particularly harsh approach to insolvency reorganizations
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Willingham v. United
States,145 a recent decision involving the 1939 Code. The carry-
over issue arose as a defense to criminal prosecution for at-
tempted tax evasion. That fact may have induced the court to
adopt a strict view of carryovers; it held that carryovers do not
survive an insolvency recapitalization when debt is wiped out,
capital altered, and new ownership substituted because these
changes destroy "continuity of business enterprise" within the
meaning of Libson Shops. The court refused to follow the tax-
payer's argument, based on New CoZonial, that the corporate
identity remained unchanged, relying instead on a factually dis-
tinguishable case.146  Willingham has been criticized;147 also it
did not involve 1954 Code years and was peculiar in that a per-
son who joined the corporation during reorganization was the
only one who stood to benefit by a decision that carryovers sur-
vived. For these reasons, it should not control future cases.
But its import, particularly its suggestion that a corporation
which has had its debts wiped out in a bankruptcy reorganization
is not deserving of an averaging benefit through loss carryovers,
bodes ill for future cases of insolvency reorganizations unless
the current statute is altered.
E. CARRYBACKS
The carryback has had a checkered history. In early years,
no carrybacks were allowed, and the immediate congressional
purpose for re-enactment in 1942 was merely to create a substi-
tute for a postwar adjustments reserve deduction. 148 Although
carrybacks have remained in the law as an averaging device, a
144. They were "arguably beyond" because § 381 is limited by the§ 382(b) continuity requirement and recapitalization may leave no
shareholder continuity. Section 382(a) governs changes of ownership
by purchase and is normally inapplicable to insolvency reorganizations.
See Krantz, supra note 136, at 392-95.
145. 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 828 (1961).
146. Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959)
(alternative holding). Change of business and ownership were distinct
in Mill Ridge.
147. See Krantz, supra note 136, at 410-14.
148. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1942).
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net operating loss still may not be carried back as many years
as it may be carried forward.
Cases involving carrybacks have been relatively rare. Al-
though courts have not considered carrybacks to be analytically
different from carryforwards, Congress in the 1954 Code specifi-
cally disallowed carrybacks in all section 381 situations except the
(F) reorganization. 149 Section 382 (a), too, confusingly discusses
only loss carryforwards, leaving the courts with perhaps an im-
pression that carrybacks are treated differently after all altera-
tions except the (F) reorganization.
A possible rationale, at least in the merger situation, for this
unexplained congressional position is a desire not to reopen prior
tax years of dissolved corporations. However, if allowance of
loss carryovers should turn only on the question of continuity of
the taxpaying entity, rules as to carrybacks should more closely
parallel those as to carryforwards. VVhen one corporation pur-
chases another, the resultant should be able to carry back a
postacquisition net operating loss only against income of the
acquiring corporation because there is no ownership or busi-
ness continuity between the resultant and acquired corpora-
tions. The question is more difficult in the case of unifying re-
organizations because some continuity exists between the resul-
tant and each constituent. It seems appropriate to allow a carry-
back in full to offset premerger income of any constituent as to
which there is sufficient ownership and business continuity to
justify survival of any premerger losses that constituent might
have had. No carryback should be allowed to the income of
any other constituent. Such a rule would avoid the problem of
allocating any postmerger losses.
In the case of divisive reorganizations, the question is
whether postdivision losses of one resultant may be carried back
to offset the entire income of years prior to the division. Since,
in most cases, only an allocated portion of a carryforward should
be allowed to postdivision income of any one resultant, 5 0 this
is a difficult question. In theory, predivision income should
be allocated just as predivision losses are. Though allocation
should be avoided where possible and though the simpler answer
would be to allow any resultant its entire carryback, fairness to
all owners of the predivision enterprise requires allocation as
to carrybacks as well as to carryforwards.15 1
149. Section 381(b) (3).
150. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
151. Suppose AB Corporation earns $100,000 in year 1. It splits up
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In addition to the above difficulties in formulating technical
rules for carryback survival, present congressional treatment of
carrybacks prompts the largely unexplored question whether
carrybacks are less important to the averaging principle than
carryforwards. A goal of averaging is to stimulate new ven-
tures by permitting early lean years to offset later lush years;
the carryback is irrelevant to this purpose. Furthermore, it
seems less important to the economy that a dissolving business
be allowed a carryback than that an infant business be allowed
a carryforward. For a going business, however, carrybacks
are a logical part of averaging, and Congress was certainly wise
to permit carrybacks to survive an (F) reorganization. The mer-
ger situation is more difficult. Perhaps Congress silently con-
cluded that the resultant corporation needs only the same av-
eraging benefits that a new company receives-but this theory
proves too much because then all carryovers would have been
eliminated. All things considered, it seems that any policy dif-
ference between carryforwards and carrybacks is not signifi-
cant enough to justify different treatment, assuming that the ad-
ministration of carrybacks after changes in corporate entity is
not prohibitively difficult. Nevertheless, congressional intent to
restrict the carryback is clear, and the need to circumvent any
anomaly in section 381(b) (3) is not as great as the need to allow
carryforwards in situations such as the insolvency reorganization.
Since, in addition, the carryback question arises less frequently,
the author would be tempted, as judge, to follow the implication
of section 381(b) (3) in most cases, though as advocate he would
be less passive.1 52
F. CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
One of the most complex and interesting aspects of the loss
carryover problem involves the status of a loss carryover when
a corporation joins or leaves an affiliated group filing consoli-
dated tax returns. Early Supreme Court decisions established
that carryovers from a separate returns period to a consolidated
returns year are limited to taxable income of the corporation
into A Corporation and B Corporation, each of its two shareholders
taking full ownership of one-half the business. In year 2, A loses
$100,000 and B breaks even. In year 3, B loses $50,000 and A breaks
even. B should not be deprived of utilizing his losses because they
occurred later.
152. A divided Tax Court equitably allowed a carryback to survive
in the very recent case of Casco Prods. Corp., 49 T.C. No. 5 (Oct. 24,
1967), but only by treating a merger as a stock redemption.
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that originally incurred the loss. 1 53 The recently revamped con-
solidated returns regulations largely adopt this approach. The
taxable income of each affiliate is computed without benefit of a
section 172 deduction;154 a consolidated net operating loss deduc-
tion is then computed for the group that may reduce consolidated
taxable income. This deduction includes carryovers from other
consolidated returns years whether or not the group has changed
members.'5 5 However, when a loss affiliate leaves the group,
its share of any consolidated carryover is available to that cor-
poration in its subsequent separate returns and not to the
group.'5" Conversely, when a corporation having carryovers
from prior separate returns years joins the group, these carry-
overs are included in any year's consolidated net operating loss
deduction only to the extent that the loss affiliate has income
for that year.'5 7 Likewise, if any member of an affiliated group
acquires carryovers of a nonaffiliate in a section 381 transaction,
those carryovers are limited to subsequent income of the ac-
quirer.'5 8
The courts have followed the prior regulations, sometimes
rather blindly, in a number of cases. 159 In addition, general prin-
ciples of loss carryover transferability have influenced consoli-
dated returns cases. Carryovers have properly been retained by
affiliated groups after a constituent loss corporation sold its assets
(either within or outside the group), whether the transferor was
153. See Planters Cotton Oil Co. v. Hopkins, 286 U.S. 332 (1932);
Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319 (1932).
154. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-12(h); 1.1502-31A(b) (1) (ii) (1966). The
statutory provisions creating the privilege to file consolidated returns,
§§ 1501-05, leave the loss carryover problem for resolution by regula-
tions. The new regulations apply only to years beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1965, so the old regulations, renumbered, are still in effect.
155. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-21(b)(1); 1.1502-78; 1.1502-31A(a)(3),
(a) (4), (d) (1) (1966).
156. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-79; 1.1502-31A(d) (1) (1966).
157. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-1(f) (1); 1.1502-21(c); 1.1502-31A(b) (3)
(1966). However, for tax years beginning after December 31, 1963, this
limitation does not apply if the new affiliate could have filed a consol-
idated return with the group in the loss year, and if no multiple sur-
tax exemption was claimed for that year. This recent liberalization is
clearly sound.
158. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-1(f); 1.1502-21(c); 1.1502-31A(b) (21)
(1966).
159. See, e.g., Phinney v. Houston Oil Field Material Co., 252 F.2d
357 (5th Cir. 1958); Midland Management Co., 38 T.C. 211 (1962); Sea-
board Commercial Corp., 28 T.C. 1034 (1957); American Trans-Ocean
Navigation Corp., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 839 (1954), affd, 229 F.2d 97
(2d Cir. 1956); Trinco Indus., Inc., 22 T.C. 959 (1954).
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dissolved 6 ° or remained in the group as a shell,' 61 because in
effect such a sale produces only a reduction in a taxpayer's busi-
ness. An unsound decision was A. R. Ruppert Plumbing &
Heating Company,'12 where a loss corporation created a sub-
sidiary, transferred assets to it, and filed consolidated returns.
The Tax Court held that prior losses could be used only to the
extent that the parent had consolidated returns period income,
basing its opinion on a technical application of the regulations
plus the New Colonial corporate entity theory. This result is
correct if the subsidiary files separate returns but not in the
consolidated returns context.
Section 269 has also been applied to consolidated returns
situations. In R. P. Collins & Company,6 3 the court found that
two companies consolidated for the purpose of utilizing pre-
acquisition carryovers, potential capital losses, and postacquisi-
tion losses. All three were disallowed although a persuasive
dissent argued that postaffiliation operating losses, because they
involved cash loss to the new owners, could never have been the
purpose of an acquisition and should be allowed to reduce con-
solidated income.6 4 On authority of Collins, the Commissioner
has attacked consolidations of commonly owned profit and loss
corporations in which the intent was to offset the profit cor-
poration's income with postaffiliation losses. Although the gov-
ernment lost one case on the facts, 165 this attack was nearly
successful in Zanesville Investment Company. 66 The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed a decision for the Commissioner, concluding that
no legislative plan prohibits offsetting income of one controlled
corporation with losses of another. This is a correct result in
theory, and it illustrates a problem with section 269. Since the
intent of consolidated returns is to permit averaging of a control
160. See Northern R.R. v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 134 (D. Mass.
1963), affd, 334 F.2d 936 (1st Cir. 1964).
161. See Joseph Weidenhoff, 32 T.C. 1222 (1959).
162. 39 T.C. 284 (1962).
163. 193 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1961), affd, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir.
1962).
164. Unfortunately, the reasoning of Collins as to postacquisition
losses has appeared in nonconsolidated returns cases. Disallowance of
such losses is perhaps justified when they were "economically realized
before the merger," as the judge found in Meridan Corp. v. United
States, 253 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But § 269 was simply used
punitively in Luke v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965), where
postmerger operating losses of the loss corporation's business were
denied the new owners.
165. Naeter Bros. Publishing Co., 42 T.C. No. 1 (1964).
166. 38 T.C. 406 (1962), rev'd, 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964).
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group's profitable and losing enterprises, offset should not be
denied because the group consolidated with the intent of averag-
ing. Though section 269 literally applies, it should not, and the
courts are forced into a "this is a tax purpose which Congress
approves as opposed to those that section 269 condemns" sort of
reasoning.
In theory, consolidated returns add a new wrinkle to the
loss carryover problem. The business entity and the taxpaying
entity are the affiliated group yet each constituent retains a
corporate identity facilitating ease of departure. Because sep-
arate taxable incomes must be computed anyway, a tracing test
after acquisition of a loss subsidiary is more workable than in a
merger situation. Furthermore, although tracing was rejected as
analytically unsound in the merger situation, 167 and although the
group is logically a single tax entity for most purposes, reten-
tion of the acquired business in a single corporation is arguably
a sufficient continuity to justify survival of a carryover if it is
restricted to future income of that loss corporation. 18 The
chief avoidance danger is that large numbers of tax free inter-
company transactions might enable a group to shift consolidated
income to whatever member has preaffiliation loss carryovers. 169
If the regulations are appropriate when a loss corporation
is acquired and placed in an affiliated group, they, like the
analogous Libson Shops doctrine, are too harsh in other situa-
tions. If a loss corporation acquires a subsidiary and consoli-
dates, it is like any other expansion of a losing enterprise by
the same owners; carryovers should survive. Likewise, consoli-
dation itself is analogous to a change of business. 7 0 Therefore,
losses incurred in separate returns years should be permitted to
carry over to consolidated returns years so long as there has
been no intervening change of ownership' 7' in the loss corpora-
167. See pp. 594-96 supra.
168. Admittedly, lines are getting somewhat arbitrary here. As-
suming change of ownership, change of business through merger causes
complete elimination of carryovers but change of business through
affiliation permits partial survival. In part, this may be a rejection of
an entity theory of the affiliated group. Primarily, it is limited recog-
nition of the corporate entity plus adoption of tracing only in its admin-
istratively easiest form-when separate income of the affiliate must be
computed for other reasons.
169. See Note, The Affiliated Group as a Tax Entity: A Proposed
Revision of the Consolidated Returns Regulations, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1415,
1421 (1965).
170. Cf. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
171. Change of ownership should be measured under standards
normally applied to loss carryover issues, not by the rules governing
eligibility to file a consolidated return. See also note 157 supra.
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tion.1 72 With each case, the test should be the same as in the
nonconsolidated context; adjustments must of course be made to
recognize economic and tax implications of consolidated returns.
Though adequate and workable, the present regulations are in-
appropriate in some situations and should be amended.
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR STATUTORY REFORM
Although one purpose of Part IV was to demonstrate that
the 1954 Code, if coherently interpreted, can in large part provide
a workable approach to loss carryover transferability, nearly all
commentators agree that statutory reform is needed. The pro-
posals, both specific and abstract, have been prolific; they differ
greatly, often reflecting underlying differences in attitude to-
ward the loss carryover. In this Part, some of the creditable
suggestions will be criticized in light of the author's conclu-
sions in Part III. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to
transform the theory of Part III into statute.
A. EXISTING PROPOSALS
A number of writers have suggested that loss carryovers
should survive any tax free reorganization, presumably section
368 and section 371 reorganizations under the 1954 Code.173 A
basic theme of this Article has been that the question of when
a loss entity has so changed that carryovers should be eliminated
does not depend upon whether an alteration was tax free. "Con-
tinuity of interest" is basic to a section 368 reorganization, but
the continuity that will satisfy an essentially tax-deferring pro-
vision is not necessarily the same as that which should justify
survival of a tax reducing attribute like the loss carryover.
Furthermore, survival of loss carryovers does not seem necessary
to accomplish other purposes behind the tax-deferring reorgani-
zation provisions.174 Although carryovers should survive most
tax free reorganizations, the standards should not be equated.
The American Law Institute has suggested a test based solely
on two-thirds change of ownership of a loss corporation, arguing
that any change-of-business test is anomalous because the busi-
ness of a loss corporation is always changed after acquisition
172. The regulations seem correct in allocating to a loss corpora-
tion that leaves an affiliated group its share of an existing consolidated
net operating loss carryforward.
173. See, e.g., Dane, Net Operating Loss Carry-Overs and Unused
Excess Profits Credits in Tax Free Reorganizations, 28 TAXES 336 (1950).
174. But see id.
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in an attempt to rehabilitate.175 As was mentioned earlier, a
test based on a significant and identifiable change of ownership
(such as two-thirds) is plausible. However, such a test ignores
the independent corporate business entity.176 Furthermore, a
change-of-business test is logical when combined with a change-
of-ownership requirement: though a losing business requires
rehabilitation, if that "rehabilitation" is radical and is not at-
tempted by those who incurred the loss, then reasons for av-
eraging disappear. Finally, a two-thirds change of ownership
test would leave much room for abuse and admittedly would
require reliance on section 269. For this reason alone,171 the
ALI proposal is an imperfect solution.
Another suggestion, based on the proponent's considerable
reluctance to allow any carryover transferability, would elimi-
nate carryovers whenever at least two of three factors are
changed-ownership, business, and corporate entity. 7 8  Cor-
porate entity, in the author's opinion, is irrelevant except, to a
limited extent, in the consolidated returns context to any test
based upon economic realities and the purposes behind income
averaging. Consequently, this proposal would deny carryovers
unnecessarily when the corporate entity changes along with busi-
ness entity (as in the Libson Shops merger) or with ownership
(as in section 371 insolvency reorganizations). Hence, this test,
too, is unsatisfactory.
A number of proposals have urged adoption of a tracing test
that would allow a certain percentage of carryovers to survive
both unifying and divisive reorganizations. The most practical,
if not the most theoretically satisfying, suggestions base the al-
lowable percentage upon the net basis of assets contributed by the
loss corporation to the new entity.179 Although there is much
logic to such a scheme, the author agrees with Chairman Wilbur
Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee1 80 that (with
175. See ALI, INcoME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 341-48 (1958).
176. This is the criticism of the ALI proposal put forth by the Ad-
visory Group on Subchapter C. See Advisory Group Hearings 568.
177. See pp. 603-04 supra.
178. See Lanning, supra note 126.
179. See E. J. Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, 3 TAX REVISION
COMPENDUm 1619, 1629 (House Comm. on Ways and Means 1959). In
Note, Corporate Reorganization and Continuity of Earnings History:
Some Tax Aspects, 65 HARV. L. REV. 648, 657 (1952), whether value or
basis of assets is to govern allocation is not explained.




the exception of divisive reorganizations and consolidated re-
turns situations) carryovers should either be allowed or elimi-
nated in full.181
One of the most intriguing proposals is that of the Advisory
Group to the House Ways and Means Committee on Subchapter
C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. While retaining, un-
fortunately, current section 381, this proposal revises section 382
to disallow carryovers after a fifty per cent change in ownership
to the extent that they exceed fifty per cent of the net worth of
the loss corporation when transferred.1 8 2 The Group recognized
that this is an arbitrary test but could find no satisfactory al-
ternative. The proposal is based on a notion that sham transac-
tions are the principal evil to be combatted; consequently, if a
loss corporation is sold as a going concern, it is likely that carry-
overs should not be eliminated. The specific test is designed to
ensure that a large carryover will only accompany transfer of
substantial operating assets. Despite its desirable tendency to
simplify somewhat existing statutory structure and to rectify
certain anomalies, this approach contains a number of problems.
First, commentators have feared that emphasis on a loss cor-
poration's net worth would encourage premature sales of declin-
ing businesses.1 8 3 Second, the test is admittedly arbitrary, fail-
ing to deal directly with some factors, such as business continu-
ity, relevant to corporate loss carryover transferability. This
should be avoided if possible. Third. the test is complex. The
change of ownership provision has proven difficult to draft. In
addition, carryovers would hinge on a loss corporation's net
worth, a figure not readily available; accounting manipulation
and litigation would probably result.18 4 Finally, the Group's
proposal places heavy reliance on section 269 because its standard
can be easily avoided. 85
B. STATUTORY REFomu-A NEW APPROACH
a. The following subsection is hereby added to section 172 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
181. See pp. 594-96 supra.
182. See Advisory Group Hearings 454-55.
183. See ALl, supra note 175, at 345.
184. This is a problem not present under a tracing test that looks to
net basis of assets at the time of merger. See Brown, supra note 179, at
1629.
185. For example, the loss corporation's assets can be sold prior to
transfer and the cash used to bolster net worth. Disposal immediately
subsequent to sale would be another abuse.
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"(1) Limitations on Carrybacks and Carryovers Applicable
to Corporations.-
(1) In General.-Notwithstanding section 269, a net
operating loss deduction allowed under this section to a cor-
poration shall exist as a net operating loss carryback and
carryover (to be applied according to the rules of subsec-
tions (b) to (j) inclusive) unless the corporation that sus-
tained the net operating loss (or any successor corporation
or corporations) -
(A) undergoes a substantial change in ownership,
as defined in paragraph (2) of this subsection, within a
one year period; and
(B) does not continue, for the subsequent two
year period, to carry on a trade or business substan-
tially the same as that conducted before the substantial
change in ownership.
(2) Substantial Change in Ownership Defined.-For
purposes of paragraph (1), substantial change of ownership
means-
(A) an acquisition or series of acquisitions (in-
cluding acquisitions in which gain or loss is not recog-
nized), which together transfer 50 per cent equity inter-
est in the corporation to persons who did not own, di-
rectly or indirectly, the equity interest transferred to
them; or
(B) a reorganization, combination, or division in-
volving the corporation in which persons previously pos-
sessing an equity interest in the corporation receive less
than a 50 percent equity interest in the corporation or
corporations resulting from the reorganization, combina-
tion, or division; or
(C) a redemption or series of redemptions which
effect transfer of a 50 per cent equity interest in the
corporation; or
(D) liquidation of the corporation, unless, imme-
diately prior to liquidation, a greater than 50 per cent
equity interest in the corporation is held by another
corporation.
Equity interest shall be broadly construed to include stock
or securities entitling the holder to traditional benefits of
corporate ownership, principally, but not exclusively, a
share in the corporation's profits.
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(3) Allocation of Carryovers After Corporate Divisions.
-In any case in which a corporation divides into two or
more resulting corporations, loss carryovers existing prior to
the division shall be allocated, according to the fair market
value of assets received from the dividing corporation, among
the resulting corporations 50 per cent of the equity interest
of which are directly owned by shareholders of the dividing
corporation, according to regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary or his delegate.
(4) Power of Secretary or His Delegate to Allow Carry-
back or Carryover.-In any case to which paragraphs (1) to
(3) apply, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized to
allow, in whole or in part, a loss carryback or carryover if
he determines that such allowance would further the pur-
poses of this section.
(5) Effective date.- [Date of enactment]"
b. Section 381(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is
repealed.
c. Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is repealed.
C. COMMENTS
The principles developed in Part III are essential to con-
sideration of the draft, since disagreement over specifics may in
fact stem from more basic disagreements in principle. In addi-
tion, certain purposes and the intended operation of this draft
need further clarification.
In general, separate treatment of tax free transactions has
been eliminated by repeal of sections 381(c) (1)"6 and 382(b),
and section 269 has been made inapplicable. The basic operative
provision is derived from present section 382(a). However,
the amendment has been placed in section 172 so that rules as
to carryover transferability are not isolated from net operating
loss provisions.
If one standard is successfully to replace the pluralistic
approach of current law, it must set down guidelines for all
cases and not leave openings for unintended taxpayer avoidance.
An example of statutory simplicity, section 382 (a) (1) (C), has
186. Whether analysis would prove other subparts of § 381(c) un-
necessary is beyond the scope of this Article. Some of the attributes
there enumerated seem closely related to the question of whether a
transfer is tax free, while others, particularly the capital loss carryover,
are analogous to the problem discussed here.
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been substantially retained for the change-of-business test. How-
ever, the author intends a more rigid test of change-of-business
than the current regulations and some cases under section 382 (a)
adopt.'8 7 Legislative history and regulations setting forth the
stricter approach will be necessary. Comprehensiveness also
requires a liberal interpretation of the parenthetical "or any suc-
cessor corporation or corporations" in paragraph (1). If a cor-
poration sustained a loss in year one, underwent an (F) reor-
ganization in year two, and had an unrelated substantial change
in ownership and business in year three, this parenthetical
would be critical to the amendment's applicability.
Given the adoption of a rigid change-of-business test, the
change-of-ownership test is most critical to the goal of compre-
hensiveness.' 88 It is also difficult to draft since all transactions,
whether or not they are tax free and whether or not the loss
corporation technically survives, must be encompassed. Princi-
ple loopholes in sections 382 (a) (1) (A) and (B) stem from their
specificity. As Maxwell Hardware and Jackson Oldsmobile illus-
trate, "ownership" of a corporation can be represented in a mul-
titude of ways. Thus, paragraph (1) (A) of this proposal turns
upon change of "equity interest," a concept only loosely defined
in paragraph (2). This is intended to be the type of security
classification scheme suggested for all of Subchapter C by
Professor Ernest J. Brown. 8 9 This draft would need accom-
panying legislative history and regulations, and a better formu-
lation may be possible. An unlimited right to share in the
profits of a corporation is most often indicative of an equity
interest (compare Maxwell Hardware); in addition, it identifies
in most cases those persons who have suffered the economic
detriment of a net operating loss. Thus, this factor is specifically
mentioned. Other factors might be relevant in determining
whether a given security represents an equity interest in a cor-
poration, for example, a right to participate in management of
the business (note Jackson Oldsmobile and Glover Packing) or
the financial status of the enterprise (e.g., fixed income bond-
holders may have a substantial equity interest in an insolvent
corporation being managed by a creditors' committee).
187. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
188. Since the Libson Shops definition of change of business is
adopted, it would be almost impossible for a loss corporation purchaser
to avoid this standard if he lacks a bona fide purpose to continue the
loss corporation business. But no such strict judicial gloss exists for a
change-of-ownership requirement.
189. See Brown, supra note 179.
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Likewise, "50 percent equity interest" is undefined. In most
cases, fair market value of equity interest securities outstanding
would be an appropriate test. However, market value of a
security may stem from characteristics other than those making
it an equity security. Furthermore, a voting trust arrangement
such as that in Glover Packing might make fair market value
irrelevant to computation of equity interest. It is believed that
courts can handle the equity interest issues intelligently if the
statute and regulations make clear in general terms what the
draftsmen intended. Leaving definitions vague should encour-
age courts to discern statutory purpose and may deter taxpayers
from attempting to abuse the statutory scheme.9 0 Admittedly,
the judiciary often demonstrates a lack of sophistication in tax
matters. However, what constitutes a substantial change of own-
ership seems the type of issue which must be answered with
reference to specific fact situations and which can be left to the
judiciary with some confidence.
Another problem was excluding cases in which a large,
publicly-held corporation has incidental shiftings in its share-
holders that by chance total over fifty per cent.'9 ' To avoid
complexity, the period over which change of ownership must
take place was shortened to one year. An intentional change
of ownership normally occurs in a short span. In cases of creep-
ing control in which there is no agreed plan of long-term ac-
quisition, it seems tolerable to allow carryover survival. 92 The
190. This proposal might be criticized on the ground that it does
not provide sufficiently predictable guidelines for the tax planner. In
most cases, the author envisions little difficulty. It is true that, with
unifications, carryover survival will be difficult to predict in close cases
until the 50% test has been better defined by the Treasury or the
courts. But the goal of deterring attempted abuse and of providing
needed flexibility outweighs this disadvantage.
191. It could be argued that the change-of-ownership test should
be tightened by hinging it upon change in the effective control of a loss
corporation. However, emphasis upon ownership rather than control
of operations still seems the appropriate criterion. Change of manage-
ment of a publicly-held corporation through a less than 50% stock
shifting is in theory a way for the owners to revitalize their losing
venture (though of course the change may not be voluntary); since
the principal economic burden of taxes and losses usually remains with
original owners, carryovers should survive.
192. It is recognized that in limiting change of ownership to a one-
year period, a possible loophole of significant proportions has been cre-
ated if many businessmen would structure acquisition of control to
avoid this time limitation (e.g., by acquiring 60% of the stock of a
corporation in two 30% purchases thirteen months apart). Since a loss
carryover survives only five years, the incentive to acquire a 50% in-
terest in this manner might be much less if paragraph (1) (A) set
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author considered a specific provision covering cases of contracted
long-term acquisition such as Glover Packing, but decided that
reasonable statutory interpretation would be more effective than
a difficult-to-draft statutory reference. In part to compensate
for this leniency, the change of business period has been length-
ened after the ownership change to catch additional tax oriented
acquisitions. 193
Turning to paragraph (2), the critical words in paragraph
(2) (A) are "directly or indirectly." They appear in section 269
but seem largely uninterpreted there. The intent is to recognize
that transfers among closely related taxpayers, such as husband
and wife or individual and his solely owned corporation, do not
in economic terms effect a change in ownership. The question
is whether the transferor and transferee are the same person
with respect to the right to share in profits and management.
The attribution rules of section 318, besides being applicable
only to "stock," seem too inflexible for this purpose. 9 4  Also
critical to paragraph (2) (A) is that it be interpreted as cover-
ing cases where a majority shareholder sells his interest to a
former minority shareholder. It is believed that this situation is
covered by the phrase "equity interest transferred to them."
The related problem of a redemption to eliminate a majority
shareholder or shareholders is covered by paragraph (2) (C).
A difficult question is whether such a redemption should always
forth a two-year limitation. The countervailing question is how many
publicly traded corporations have 50% of their stock transferred in a
two, as opposed to a one-year period. This would require statistical
analysis. One alternative is found in § 382 (a) which requires that
the change of ownership involve a limited number of people. But that
creates an avoidance opportunity. As another alternative, the inci-
dental transfer problem might be covered specifically in the statute,
but this seems exceedingly difficult. Or perhaps the problem would not
arise no matter how long a time period was created because the
Commissioner could never prove that incidental transfers all occurred
between unrelated persons. But that seems an unsatisfactory resolu-
tion unless the one-year time limit is intolerable. The author has hesi-
tantly kept the one calendar year requirement, primarily because § 382
(a) has to some extent a similar loophole that has not aroused atten-
tion. For example, if an acquirer purchased 30% of loss corporation
15 days before the end of tax year 1 and 30% 15 days after the end of
tax year 2, § 382(a) would not apply. Of course, § 382(a) is backed up
by § 269 while the author's draft is not. Therefore, further considera-
tion might compel a decision to lengthen the limit to two years and to
find another resolution to the heavily traded corporation problem.
193. Certain mechanical problems which do not seem overwhelm-
ing, such as when the year period begins and when a change of owner-
ship should be deemed to occur, have not been considered.
194. Cf. Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342,(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
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result in carryover elimination because the business is thereby
contracted. Arguments seem closely balanced as to whether
such contraction should by itself constitute a change of busi-
ness if remaining shareholders do not reinvest compensating capi-
tal thus, as to carryovers, eliminating as a practical matter the
redemption technique of shifting control.
Paragraph (2) (B) is intended to produce the same result
whether a combination or division is taxable and whether or
not the loss corporation technically survives. Therefore, no ref-
erence was made to Subchapter C definitions of reorganization,
though use of that word will of course influence judicial inter-
pretation (desirably, it is hoped, in cases such as the (E) or
(F) reorganization). 195
The purpose of paragraph (2) (1)) is, of course, to isolate
liquidations in which there is a successor corporation to inherit
carryovers. A rule permitting survival whenever a corporation
is owned substantially by one person was rejected as being far
too broad; however, a fifty per cent control test is broader than
present section 381 (a) (1). It is also critical to paragraph (2)
that carryovers be disallowed if the successor to a liquidation
acquired the liquidated loss corporation in a transaction falling
under (A) or (B), except in cases when the parent is a cor-
poration with no independent operating assets of its own so that
no change of business occurs.
Paragraph (3) is admittedly inadequate. The primary pur-
pose of this Article has been to formulate appropriate rules for
the survival of loss carryovers after corporate alterations; al-
though Part III points out when, in general, allocation is ap-
propriate,196 the drafting problems are considerable. The major
problem is defining those divisive transactions as to which allo-
cation is appropriate. Only when equity securities of the re-
sulting corporations are distributed to shareholders of the divid-
195. Under this test, carryovers of both constituents to a merger
would survive only if owners of each received 50% ownership in the
resultant. Some have argued that this is too harsh-that the 20% test
in § 382(b) is appropriate in merger situations. See Advisory Group
Hearings 838 (Statement of Bernard Wolfman). Assuming that busi-
nessmen are carryover conscious, the effect of the author's proposal
would probably be to encourage: (1) owners of loss corporations re-
ceiving disproportionately large ownership in resultants; or (2) mergers
between large loss corporations and smaller profit corporations. Con-
sidering both the averaging concept and the economic effects of tax
measures, this result does not seem unfortunate. At worst, the 50% test
is arbitrary; for reasons more fully discussed in Part III, it seems ap-
propriate.
196. See p. 596 supra.
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ing corporation should allocation be necessary. 197 There appear
to be three drafting approaches to this problem. First, the prob-
lem can be left, with guidelines, to the Commissioner. Second,
the definitions of divisive reorganizations in sections 355 and
368 (a) (1) (D) could be adopted. Third, a more comprehensive
specific definition could be attempted. The second alternative
is unsatisfactory because it would not cover every situation which
raises a carryover allocation problem, primarily because the "con-
trol" definition of section 368 is not the same as the change of
ownership definition in this amendment. The first alternative
has been adopted here for convenience. It is probably most sat-
isfactory, but the author made no attempt to draft a specific
but comprehensive alternative. Also, a provision is perhaps
needed referring to the converse allocation problem of a carry-
back after a divisive reorganization.
Finally, on the theory that this provision is, if anything, too
restrictive, paragraph (4) gives the Commissioner a power simi-
lar to that in section 269(b) to allow part or all of any carry-
over otherwise eliminated by this subsection if he finds that
purposes behind the net operating loss deduction would thereby
be furthered. Given the Treasury's current attitude toward car-
ryovers, such a provision would surely be little used. But it
seems a sensible way to insert additional flexibility into the
statute.
Hopefully, this proposal lacks the type of glaring loopholes
that have led to constant tinkering with Subchapter C provi-
sions. If so, it is believed that this amendment would pre-
sent a unified and realistic approach to loss carryover transfer-
ability consistent with the purposes behind income averaging.
197. Cf. Mansfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 346 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
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